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Abstract 
We present a new idea to design information theoretically secure key 
exchange protocol, based on a new form of randomness, called « Deep 
Randomness », generated in such a way that probability distribution of the 
output signal is made unknowledgeable for an observer. By limiting, thanks 
to Deep Randomness, the capacity of the opponent observer to perform 
Bayesian inference over public information to estimate private information, 
we can design protocols, beyond Shannon limit, enabling two legitimate 
partners, sharing originally no common private information, to exchange 
secret information with accuracy as close as desired from perfection, and 
knowledge as close as desired from zero by any unlimited passive opponent. 
We introduce the Deep Random assumption, based on Prior Probability 
theory developed by Jaynes. Deep Random assumption gives a rigorous rule 
to perform Bayesian inference under uncertainty situation. We also present a 
workable example of protocol with a  mathematical proof for information 
theoretical security under Deep Random assumption. At last we present and 
develop a method that we present to generate Deep Randomness from 
classical computing resources. 
 
Key words. Perfect secrecy, Information theoretical security, Deep Random, advantage distillation, 
secret key agreement, unconditional security, quantum resistant 
 
Modern cryptography mostly relies on mathematical problems commonly trusted as very difficult to 
solve, such as large integer factorization or discrete logarithm, belonging to complexity theory. No 
certainty exist on the actual difficulty of those problems, not even the truth of the famous P≠NP 
conjecture, and, in addition, most of them are not resistant to quantum computing, which should make 
them useless in the next decades. Some other methods, rather based on information theory, have been 
developed since early 90’s. Those methods relies on hypothesis about the opponent (such as « memory 
bounded » adversary [6]) or about the communication channel (such as « independent noisy 
channels » [5]) ; unfortunately, even if they have been proven Information Theoretically secure under 
given hypothesis, none of those hypothesis are easy to ensure in practice. At last, some other methods 
based on physical theories like quantum  indetermination [3] or chaos generation have been described 
and experimented, but they are complex to implement, and, again, relies on solid but not proven and 
still partly understood theories. 
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Considering this theoretically unsatisfying situation, we propose to explore a new path, where 
Information Theoretical security against unlimited opponent can be reached, without relying on any 
assumption about the opponent, that is supposed to have unlimited calculation and storage power, nor 
about the communication channel, that is supposed to be perfectly public, accessible and equivalent 
for any playing party (legitimate partners and opponents). The considered opponent is passive, which 
means that it does not interfere actively in the communication by suppressing, adding or modifying 
information exchanged between the legitimate partners; it just has a full access to it. Active opponent 
could be considered by adding authentication schemes, but this is not the core objective of the present 
work. 
I. Introduction 
Definition of “Information Theoretically Secure” Security Property 
The most common Security Property to study Information Theoretically secure protocols is Perfect 
Secrecy, introduced by Claude Shannon [1]. This Security Property is defined as the condition 
 ( | )   ( ), where  designates the private information or “Message” in the protocol, although 
  designates the public information or “Encrypted information” in the protocol. As a security 
property, Perfect Secrecy has two drawbacks: (i) it is absolute and thus doesn’t give rule to measure 
the secrecy as soon as  ( )   ( | ) (where  ( ) designates Shannon’s entropy), (ii) it does not 
explicitly differentiate the point of view of the opponent and the point of view of the legitimate 
receiver, and thus gives no rule to compare them in terms of capacity to access the private information 
as soon as the above inequality is strict. 
In a very general view, in order to define the security property that we aim at satisfying, we consider 
here communication protocols that can be modelized as proposed by Csiszàr and Körner [15]. The 
legitimate partners are   and  , and   is the passive opponent. The purpose of the protocol is for   
and   to reach common knowledge, with least possible errors of an output digital information, and to 
ensure that the passive opponent can learn the lesser possible information about that output digital 
information. By convention, the reference output digital information is the one reached by   called the 
Secret Common Output information and denoted  . For that reason   will be called the legitimate 
receiver, even if the protocol is not designed as a one way transmission.   is a discrete random 
variable taking values over a finite alphabet  .   and   communicate over a Discrete Memoryless 
Channel (DMC) called main channel and   generates its best version, denoted  , of the Secret 
Common Output information.   is a discrete random variable taking values over a finite alphabet   
(in most cases    ). The opponent   receives exact or altered copy (depending on the security 
model) of all information exchanged on the main channel over another DMC called side channel or 
wire-tap channel, and then generates its best version of the Secret Common Output information 
denoted  .   is a discrete random variable taking values over a finite alphabet   (in most cases   
 ). The alphabets       take values in a sample space  .  ’s objective is to obtain the best possible 
knowledge of  . The protocol is a predefined and public communication routine involving public 
parameters  ; it is then denoted  ( ). Each stakeholder in the protocol ( , , ) is an entity capable 
to Generate random bit strings, Publish bit strings on its DMC (  is however supposed passive), Read 
bit strings published on its DMC, Store bit strings, Make calculation on bit strings. 
Then, we define that the protocol is “Information Theoretically Secure” if,     , there exists a value 
of the parameter   such that: 
 ( | )   ( | )  (   ) ( )                                                     (  ) 
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It is easy to see that this Security Property tends to Perfect Secrecy when    . Indeed, for the above 
inequality to hold when    , it is necessary that (i)  ( | )    which means that the protocol is 
errorless, and (ii) that  ( | )   ( ) which means that  ( | )   ( ). Csiszàr and Körner have 
shown that the secrecy capacity    of the protocol is lower-bounded by: 
      
  
( ( | )   ( | )) 
which explains the rationale for the choice of (  ) above to characterize the security property. The 
literature also often reference this property under the name ‘Unconditional Security’, even if that 
naming may appear a bit improper due to the fact that some constraint   is always applied on the 
stakeholders or on the communication channels, in order to overcome Shannon’s impossibility 
theorem (see next section). 
The constraint   applied to the side channel compared to the main channel may vary with the model. 
For instance, in Partially Independent Channels model introduced by Maurer in [5], the constraint is 
that the opponent receives the public information over a noisy side BSC (Binary Symmetric Channel) 
whose noise is at least partially statistically independent of the noise applying on the main BSC. It is 
then shown that a protocol can be designed to reach (  ) under that constraint, even if the opponent 
has unlimited calculation and storage power. Another example is BB84, the first Quantum Key 
Distribution protocol proposed in [3], in which the constraint is that for each digit transmitted thanks 
to the polarization of a photon, the opponent has to choose a filter among 2 possible ones to measure 
the polarization wearing the digital information, and if the opponent makes the wrong choice, it 
obtains a random result rather than the actual result. This constraint legitimately comes from two 
properties of quantum systems: (i) the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and (ii) the no-cloning 
theorem. It is then shown as well that BB84 can reach (  ) under that constraint, even if the opponent 
has unlimited calculation and storage power. 
In this article, the constraint of the Security Model is called “Deep Random Assumption”. It is 
detailed, together with the Security Model, in the next sections. It relies on the fact that the probability 
distribution used by each legitimate partner to generate private information is made ‘unknown’ for any 
other party (including the other partner and of course the opponent). We rigorously explain what we 
mean by ‘unknown’ probability distribution in the section presenting the Deep Random Assumption 
hereafter. We present in Section III a protocol that satisfies (  ) under Deep Random Assumption, 
even if the opponent has unlimited calculation and storage power. Section III also presents the 
comparison and the similarities between our protocol and both BB84 and Maurer’s protocol. 
Shannon and the need for Bayesian inference 
Shannon, in [1], established his famous impossibility result. Shannon defines perfect secrecy of a 
secrecy system, as its ability to equal the probability of the clear message  ( ) and the conditional 
probability  ( | ) of the clear message knowing the encrypted message. In the case where the 
encryption system is using a shared secret key   with a public transformation procedure to transform 
the clear message into the encrypted message, Shannon establishes that perfect secrecy can only be 
obtained if ( )   ( ). 
It is a common belief in the cryptologic community that, in cases where the legitimate partners 
initially share no secret information (which we can write  ( )   ), the result of Shannon thus means 
that it is impossible for them to exchange a perfectly secret (or almost perfectly secret) bit of 
information. The support for that belief is that, in the absence of key entropy, the conditional 
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expectation  [ | ], that is the best possible estimation of   knowing  , is completely and equally 
known by all the parties (legitimate receiver and opponent), as : 
 [ | ]  ∑ 
 ( | ) ( )
∑  ( |  ) (  )  
 
 
and thus, that the legitimate receiver cannot gain any advantage over the opponent when he tries to 
estimate the secret clear message from the public encrypted message. This reasoning however 
supposes that all the parties have a full knowledge of the distribution  ( ), enabling them to perform 
the above Bayesian inference to estimate  from  . 
Shannon himself warned the reader of [1] to that regard, but considered that this assumption is fairly 
reasonable (let’s remember that calculaters were almost not yet existing when he wrote his article): 
« There are a number of difficult epistemological questions connected with the theory of secrecy, or in fact with 
any theory which involves questions of probability (particularly a priori probabilities, Bayes’ theorem, etc.) 
when applied to a physical situation. Treated abstractly, probability theory can be put on a rigorous logical 
basis with the modern measure theory approach. As applied to a physical situation, however, especially when 
“subjective” probabilities and unrepeatable experiments are concerned, there are many questions of logical 
validity. For example, in the approach to secrecy made here, a priori probabilities of various keys and 
messages are assumed known by the enemy cryptographer. » 
The model of security that we develop in this article, by enabling the legitimate partners to use a 
specific form of randomness where the a priori probabilities of the messages cannot be efficiently 
known by the opponent, puts this opponent in a situation where the above reasoning based on 
Bayesian inference no longer stands. 
It is remarkable that in his considerations about Perfect Secrecy, and in his proof of the impossibility 
result, Shannon only considers errorless protocols, meaning protocols such that  ( |   )  
 ( |   )   . As soon as the protocol is not errorless, and assuming that the protocol has no prior 
key arrangement ( ( )   ), then the impossibility result is intuitively interpreted as the fact that the 
legitimate partner cannot get a strictly “lesser” error rate than the opponent; “lesser” meaning as 
measured in the sample space that is assumed to wear a distance metric. We give in [13] a relation 
between secrecy measurement based on a distance in the sample space and secrecy measurement 
based on conditional entropy, as proposed by Csiszàr and Körner, when the sample space is a subset of 
the fairly general Euclidean space   . For non-trivial message distribution, the function  ( ) that sets 
the most probable message given the public information is determined as the unique solution to 
    ‖ ( )   ‖ 
That unique solution is of course  [ | ], the conditional expectation of the secret information 
(generically called by Shannon “message”) knowing the public information (generically called by 
Shannon “cryptogram”). The determination of  [ | ] requires knowledge of the distribution  ( ). 
As soon as the opponent doesn’t know the distribution  ( ), he cannot determine the unique optimal 
solution  ( ). This does not mean of course that the error rate of the legitimate receiver will become 
automatically lesser than the error rate of the opponent, but it explains why the proof of Shannon 
cannot any longer be trivially applied in such cases. 
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Prior probabilities theory 
Before presenting the Deep Random assumption, it is needed to introduce Prior probability theory. 
The art of prior probabilities consists in assigning probabilities to a random event in a context of 
partial or complete uncertainty regarding the probability distribution governing that random event. The 
first author who has rigorously considered this question is Laplace [10], proposing the famous 
principle of insufficient reason by which, if an observer does not know the prior probability of 
occurrence of 2 events, he should consider them as equally likely. In other words, if a random variable 
  can take several values        , and if no information regarding the prior probabilities  (    ) 
is available for the observer, he should assign them  (    )    ⁄  in any attempt to produce 
inference from an experiment of  . 
Several authors observed that this principle can lead to conclusion contradicting the common sense in 
certain cases where some knowledge is available to the observer but not reflected in the assignment 
principle. 
If we denote    the set of all prior information available to observer regarding the probability 
distribution of a certain random variable (‘prior’ meaning before having observed any experiment of 
that variable), and    any public information available regarding an experiment of  , it is then 
possible to define the set of possible distributions that are compatible with the information      
   regarding an experiment of  ; we denote this set of possible distributions as: 
   
The goal of Prior probability theory is to provide tools enabling to make rigorous inference reasoning 
in a context of partial knowledge of probability distributions. A key idea for that purpose is to consider 
groups of transformation, applicable to the sample space of a random variable  , that do not change 
the global perception of the observer. In other words, for any transformation   of such group, the 
observer has no information enabling him to privilege   ( )   (   | ) rather than     ( )  
 (   ( )| ) as the actual conditional distribution. This idea has been developed by Jaynes [7], in 
order to avoid the incoherence brought in some cases by the imprudent application of Laplace 
principle. 
We will consider only finite groups of transformation, because one manipulates only discrete and 
bounded objects in digital communications. We define the acceptable groups   as the ones fulfilling 
the 2 conditions below: 
(  ) Stability - For any distribution      , and for any transformation    , then         
(  ) Convexity - Any distribution that is invariant by action of   does belong to    
It can be noted that the set of distributions that are invariant by action of   is exactly: 
  ( )  {
 
| |
∑    
   
|      } 
The condition (  ) is justified by the fact that in the absence of information enabling the observer to 
privilege    from     , he should choose equivalently one or the other distribution, but then of 
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course the average distribution 
 
| |
∑         should still belong to the set    of possible distributions 
knowing  . 
The set of acceptable groups as defined above is denoted: 
   
Let’s consider some examples. 
Example 1: we consider a 6-sides dice. We are informed that the distribution governing the 
probability to draw a given side is altered, but we have no information of what that distribution 
actually is, and we have no available information regarding an experiment. We want nevertheless to 
assign an a priori probability distribution for the draw of dice. In this very simple case, it seems quite 
reasonable to assign an a priori probability of   ⁄  to each side. A more rigorous argument to justify 
this decision, based on the above, is the following: let’s consider   the finite group of transformation 
that let the dice unchanged, this group   is well known, it is generated by the 3 axis 90° rotations, and 
has 24 elements. It is clear here that     . It is also clear that, by considering a given distribution 
(       ), the a priori information available to the observer gives him no ground to privilege 
(       ) rather than (  ( )     ( )) for any    , and therefore the distribution should be of the 
form: 
{(
 
| |
∑   ( )
   
)
  {    }
}
{(     )}
 
It is easy to calculate that whatever is (       ), 
 
| |
∑   ( )
   
 
 
 
∑  
 
   
 
 
 
 
and therefore in this trivial example, the Laplace principle applies nicely. 
Example 2: let’s now suppose that we have the result   of a draw of the dice. Then the symmetry 
disappears and the opponent may want to assign, as an extreme example, a probability 
     ( )  {
              
           
 
which does not follow Laplace principle although one could argue that the knowledge of one single 
draw is not incompatible with the distribution {     ⁄ }. We however clearly don’t want to exclude 
that extreme choice from the set of theoretically valid assignment made by the observer. An applicable 
group is in this case the sub-group   of   that let the side   invariant. It is easy to see that it is 
composed with the 4 rotations (                ) whose axis is determined by the centers of the 
sides   and    . 
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{(
 
| |
∑   ( )
   
)
  {    }
}
{(     )}
 {                    {     } {     } |
   
   
   
        
} 
One could argue that in a given probabilistic situation, there may exist several groups of 
transformation in   , and in that case, the choice of a given such group may appear arbitrary to assign 
the probability distribution. Although that oddness is not a problem for our purpose, we can solve it 
when 2 reasonable conditions are fulfilled: (i) we only consider finite sample space (note that objects 
in digital communication theory are bounded and discrete), and (ii) we assume that    is convex 
(which can be ensured by design of the Deep Random source). Under those 2 conditions, all groups of 
transformation applying on the sample space are sub-groups of the finite (large) group of permutations 
  applying on all the possible states, and if 2 groups of transformations   and    applying on the 
sample space are in   , it is easy to see that      is still a finite sub-group of  , it contains   and    
and it is still in   . Consequently, for any observer having the same knowledge   of the distribution, 
there exists a unique maximal sub-group      , and this one should be ideally applied to obtain a 
maximal restriction of the set of distribution (because it is easy to check that if     , then   ( )  
  (  )). We can remark also that, if the uniform distribution is in   , then ⋂   ( )       because 
  ( ) then always contains the uniform distribution. 
However, it is not necessary for our purpose to be able to determine such unique maximal sub-group 
   if it exists. 
Another objection could be that the definition of    may appear too ‘black or white’ (a distribution 
belongs or does not belong to   ), although real situations may not be so contrasted. This objection is 
not applicable to our purpose because in the case of Deep Random Generation, that we will introduce 
in section IV, we can ensure by design that distributions do belong to a specific set   . But otherwise, 
generally speaking, it is somehow preferable to draft the condition (  ) as: 
(  ) For any distribution  , and for any transformation   in such group, the observer has no 
information enabling him to privilege   rather than    as the actual distribution. 
 
Deep Random assumption 
We can now introduce and rigorously define the Deep Random assumption. The Deep Random 
assumption imposes a rule enabling to make rigorous inference reasoning about an observer   in a 
context where that observer   only has partial knowledge of a probability distribution. 
Let   be a private random variable with values in a metric set  . Keeping the notations of the previous 
section, we still denote    the set of all prior information available to observer regarding the 
probability distribution of    (‘prior’ meaning before having observed any experiment of that 
variable), and    any public information available regarding an experiment of  . Typically,   
represents a secret information that   has to determine with the highest possible accuracy, and 
        represents the public information available to   (like for instance the information about 
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the design of the Deep Random source, plus the information exchanged during a communication 
protocol as introduced in the following sections). 
For any group   of transformations applying on the sample space  , we denote by   ( ) the set of all 
possible conditional expectations when the distribution of   courses   ( ). In other words: 
  ( )  { ( )   [ | ]|      ( )} 
Or also: 
  ( )  { ( )  ∫   ( )  
 
 
|      ( )} 
The Deep Random assumption prescribes that, if     , the strategy    of the opponent observer  , 
in order to estimate   from the public information  , should be chosen by the opponent observer   
within the restricted set of strategies: 
     ( )                                                                      ( ) 
The Deep Random assumption can thus be seen as a way to restrict the possibilities of   to choose his 
strategy in order estimate the private information   from his knowledge of the public information  . It 
is a fully reasonable assumption as exposed in the previous section presenting Prior probability theory, 
because the assigned prior distribution should remain stable by action of a transformation that let the 
distribution uncertainty unchanged. 
( ) suggests of course that    should eventually be picked in ⋂   ( )     (that equals to   (  ) 
when    exists), but it is enough for our purpose to find at least one group of transformation with 
which one can apply efficiently the Deep Random assumption to the a protocol in order to measure an 
advantage distilled by the legitimate partners compared to the opponent. 
 
The security model 
In our security model, we consider secrecy protocols being specific case of the Csiszàr and Körner 
model, where all the information exchanged by the legitimate partners   and   over the main channel 
are fully available to the passive opponent  .   has unlimited computing and storage power.   and   
share initially no private information. 
 Beyond being capable to Generate random bit strings, Publish bit strings on the main channel, Read 
published bit strings from the main channel, Store bit strings, and Make calculation on bit strings, the 
legitimate partners   and   are also capable to generate bit strings with Deep Randomness, by using 
their Deep Random Generator (DRG). A DRG is a random generator that produces an output with a 
probability distribution that is made unknown, under the meaning given in previous sections, to an 
external observer. We present in Section IV how a DRG can be implemented with classical computing 
resources. 
  is capable to Read all published bit strings from the main channel, Store bit strings, and Make 
calculation on bit strings, with unlimited computing and storage power. But when   desires to infer a 
private information generated by  ’s DRG (or by  ’s DRG) from public information, he can only do it 
in respect of the Deep Random assumption ( ) presented in previous section. This assumption creates 
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a ‘virtual’ side channel for the opponent conditioning the optimal information   he can obtain to 
estimate the Secret Common Output information  . 
This assumption is fully reasonable, as established in the former sections, under the condition that the 
DRG of   and the DRG of   can actually produce distributions that are truly undistinguishable and 
unpredictable among a set   ( ). 
The protocols that we consider obey the Kerckhoffs’s principle by the fact that their specifications are 
entirely public.  
 
Information Theoretically Secure Protocols (ITSP) 
The main purpose of this work is to introduce how to design an « Information Theoretically Secure 
Protocol » (ITSP) under Deep Random assumption, and to introduce how to generate Deep Random 
from classical computing resources. 
We consider protocols as per the Security Model presented in previous section,  
 
in which   (resp.  ) requests its Deep Random Generator (DRG) to obtain an experiment   (resp.  ) 
of a private random variable with hidden probability distribution   (resp.   );   (resp.  ) publishes 
the set of information   (resp.  ) on the public channel along the protocol.   calculates the Secret 
Common Output information  (     ), with value in metric space  .   calculates its estimation 
 (     ) of the Secret Common Output information, also with value in  . In this model,    is the 
public information available regarding the DRG of   or   (that are supposed to have the same design), 
and    {   } is the set of information published by the partners along the execution of the protocol. 
The DRG of   is run by   completely privately and independently of  , and reversely the DRG of   
is run by   completely privately and independently of  . The 2 DRG are thus not in any way secretly 
correlated, as one of the assumptions of the security model is that   and   share initially no private 
information. 
The eavesdropping opponent   who has a full access to the public information, calculates its own 
estimation  ( ) (that we will also shortly denote  (   )).   is called ‘strategy’ of the opponent. 
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As introduced in the ‘Deep Random assumption’ section,    designates the public information 
available about a DRG. We assume here that    is the same for both DRG of   and  , meaning that 
they have the same design. 
From the Deep Random assumption, for any group   in   , the set of optimal strategies for the 
opponent can be restricted to: 
  (   )  { ( )   [ | ]| (  ( )    ( ))    ( )    ( )} 
Then, the protocol  is a ITSP if it verifies the following property ( ): 
         |      (   )  ( | )   ( | )                                   ( ) 
It has been shown ([4], [5]) that when a protocol satisfies  ( | )   ( | )   , it can be 
complemented with Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification techniques to satisfy the targeted 
security property (  ) introduced in the first section with   as small as desired. 
We will also impose a second condition for the definition of an ITSP  . The second condition ensures 
that one can implement a DRG suitable for the protocol   thanks to a recursive and continuous 
generation algorithm that emulates locally the protocol. This approach is presented in section IV and 
introduced below. The second condition is the following: 
     such that for any strategy  ( )  { [ | ]|  ( )     }, there exists an actual distribution 
 ( )      of the variables   and   that verifies ( | )   ( | )    
(  ) 
The condition (  ) means that for any optimal strategy  ( ) for the distribution  , there exists a new 
distribution  ( )     , such that the condition  ( | )   ( | )    is satisfied (we take    
     to calculate  ( | ) because symmetry in the roles   and   can be assumed when their DRG 
have same design).   does not depend on    because the generation of a distribution by a DRG takes 
place before any instantiation of the protocol. The interest of that condition is that it enables to build a 
Deep Random Generator as follows: 
Deep Random Generation 
A DRG is designed in association with a given ITSP  . The DRG executes continuously the following 
recursive procedure: at each step   , the generator emulates the ITSP internally and picks (through 
classical randomness) a new couple of identical distributions     ( )          
 ( )      ( ) 
that defeats the optimal strategy (thus belonging to { [ | ]|  ( )     }) for the past distributions 
for    . This is always possible for an ITSP as given by condition (  ). The source of secret 
entropy is the current values of the inifinite counters (several can run in parallel) of the continuous 
recursive process, together with the classical random that is used at each step to pick a defeating 
distribution. 
A detailed presentation of a DRG using a recursive method as introduced above can be found in 
Section IV. 
An example of ITSP is given in Section III, as well as a comparison between that example and well 
known Bennett and Brassard Quantum Key Agreement protocol BB84. 
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In Section II, we present the formalism of Bernoulli random variables that we use to design our 
protocol; notations are defined and first considerations are discussed; Section II can be skipped for a 
conceptual, non-technical, reading of this article. 
In Section III, we present our protocol, an example of ITSP, and we present the main theorem that 
establishes Information Theoretical Security of the protocol ; a high level argumentation of the proof 
is given in Section III, while a detailed and fully rigorous proof can be found in Annex 1, with a set of 
preparatory technical results; 
In Section IV, we present some methods using classical computing resources to design a Deep 
Random Generator; 
In Section V, we draw conclusions about the present work and open on further questions to progress 
towards applications to modern cryptography. 
In Annex 1, we give the mathematical proofs that the protocol introduced in Section III verifies 
properties ( ) and (  ). 
In Annex 2, we prove technical results that are needed to configure a Deep Random Generator 
 
II. Notations and first considerations 
The protocol that we will present in Section III uses Bernoulli random variables, which present the 
advantage to enable Reconciliation thanks to the law of large numbers. 
Let’s define some notations. Considering   (       ) and   (       ) some parameter vectors 
in [   ]  and   (       ) and   (       ) some experiment vectors in {   }
 ,       
  two 
integers, and   [   ], we define: 
    (resp.    ) the scalar product of   and   (resp.   and  ) 
| |  ∑   
 
    ; | |  ∑   
 
    
    { |    }  { |    } 
  (       ) |           
    (       ) |      (    )  (    ) 
    (       ) |      (    )  (    ) 
    (       ) |      (    )    (    ) 
  ( )  ∏(     (    )(    ))
 
   
 
that represents probability of obtaining   in a draw of a Bernoulli random variable with parameter 
vector  . 
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  ( )  ∏(     (    ))
 
   
 
    ( )  ∑   ( )
 |     
     ( )   (    )  ( )  ∑   ( )
 || |  
 
    ( )  (
 
 
)   (   )    
that represents the Bernoulli coefficient of parameter  . 
We will also manipulate permutation operators over vectors. For     , we write     ( )  
   (      )  {   ( )   } and | |      (    ( )). The permutation of a vector is the 
following linear application: 
       ( )  (  ( )     ( )) where   represents the symmetric group 
The calculations about Bernoulli random variable take place in the vector space of multinomials with 
  variables and local degree 1, noted  ( ), whose {  ( )}  {   }  and {  ( )}  {   }  are basis. It is 
easy to justify that {  ( )}  {   }  is a basis by noting the inversion formula: 
∑   ( )    
  {   } 
  ( )  ∑  ( )
   
 
To ease the manipulation of upper bounds, we will use the notation  ( ) for any quantity with value 
in  and whose absolute value is bounded by . 
If   and   are two partners, owning private parameter vectors    ⁄  and   ⁄  respectively (where   is a 
real number parameter   ), and generating vectors   and   respectively through Bernoulli random 
variables from   ⁄  and   ⁄  respectively, we consider the respective random variables    and    
such that : 
   
   
 
      
   
 
 
As shown in Proposition 4 (i): 
 [(     )
 |   ]  
 
  
 
As soon as the opponent knows the probability distributions used respectively by   and   to 
independently generate respectively   and  , he can generate a strategy   
 (   ) from the public 
information (   ), by using Bayesian inference. That strategy this time verifies: 
 [(  
 (   )    )
 
]   [(     )
 ] 
For a proof, see Proposition 6 in Annex 1. 
  
 (   ) is of course the conditional expectation  [  |   ]. 
If  is the probability distribution of  , the optimal strategy   
 (   ) is expressed by: 
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 (   )   [  |   ]  
∫
   
    (
 
 ) 
 
  [   ] 
 ( )  
∫   (
 
 ) 
 
  [   ] 
 ( )  
 
that clearly depends on the knowledge of . 
DRG’s Independence Phenomenon 
However it is possible to find a strategy as efficient as   
  without having knowledge of  , when   or 
   is symmetric (  is symmetric meaning that            ). We call that situation 
Independence Phenomenon because no information is given to favor   from     for any 
permutation     . In that case, the strategy: 
    (   )  
 | || |
  
 
gives the following inequality (see Proposition 5 in Annex 1), comparable to the performance of   
 : 
 [(       )
 
]  
 
  
 
That efficient strategy takes advantage of the symmetry resulting from the independence between the 
choices of the legitimate partners for their respective distributions. We will see in section III that the 
Independence Phenomenon is an important problem to overcome in the proposed ITSP. 
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III. Presentation of the protocol and proof of perfect secrecy 
In this Section we present an example of ITSP. Besides being hidden to the opponent, we will see that 
the probability distribution used by each legitimate partner also need to have specific properties in 
order to prevent the opponent to evaluate    with the same accuracy than the legitimate partners by 
using the Independence Phenomenon introduced in Section II. 
When Bernoulli random variables are considered through quadratic evaluation, the probability 
distribution  of a legitimate partner can be considered through its quadratic matrix: 
  (   )  ∫      ( )  
 
[   ] 
 
   is a symmetric matrix with elements in [   ]. 
  is assumed even. The notation    represents the set of all subsets   of {     } containing   ⁄  
elements. We remind that for     , the notation   ̅designates {     }   thus also in   . Let’s first 
introduce the canonical mid-segment: 
   {    
 
 ⁄ } 
and the canonical mid-segment permutation    that sends    in   ̅ and vice versa: 
         (    
 
 ⁄ ) 
With this, we now introduce the « tidied form » of a probability distribution  . For any  , there exist 
a (not necessarily unique) pair of permutations (  
    
 ) in    such that: 
  ( )  ∑       (   )
         ̅
    
    
(
 
  
∑     (   )
         ̅
) 
  ( )  ∑       (   )
         ̅
    
    
(
 
  
∑     (   )
         ̅
) 
We remark that composing   by    does not change a pair (  
    
 ) due to the symmetry of   . 
Actually, we will call    a tidying permutation of   as being either (with 50% chance) a   
  or a 
  
 . In other words, if we designate by    the sub-group    {    |      ( )   }, then we 
mean that picking a tidying permutation of   is equivalent to choose a permutation uniformly within 
{  
      
         
      
      |        } (obviously this set does not depend on 
which possible pair (  
    
 ) is chosen). 
We then call a tidied form of  , denoted by     , a distribution obtained by composing   with any 
possible tidying permutation picked randomly. In other words, a tidied form of a distribution is a 
distribution of the form: 
 ̃( )  
 
 
(    (  )      (  )) (   ( )       ( ))
 
|   |
∑       
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Then we define the following probability distribution set: 
 ( )  { ||  ( )    ( )|  √ } 
It can be seen with a bit of attention that |  ( )    ( )|    if and only if   is different from its 
symmetric projection 
 ̅  
 
  
∑    
    
 
The parameter   is a measure of a distance between  and ̅ . 
Tidied form are interesting because 2 distributions in  ( ) that are put in their tidied form      and 
       then avoid the DRG’s Independence Phenomenon introduced in Section II. Indeed, 
comparing inequality obtained at Proposition 4 (ii) with result of Lemma 1, both shown in Annex 1, 
gives: 
 [(       )
 
]
     
   
  
 
 ( )
  
     [(     )
 ]          
  (
 
  
) 
 
The property of a distribution defined as ‘belonging to  ( )’ will represent the public prior 
information    (as defined in Section I) for distributions chosen in the protocol presented below. 
Now we can explicit our example of ITSP protocol. It will be demonstrated in Theorem 1 and 
Theorem 2 that the presented ITSP fulfills the 2 conditions ( ) and (  ) defining an ITSP. The 
protocol doesn’t have purpose to be optimal in terms of implementation. We will discuss quantitative 
aspects in Section V, and in related works. 
Here are the steps of the proposed ITSP: 
  and   are the legitimate partners of the Security Model presented in Section I. The steps of the 
protocol (         ) are the followings: 
Step 1 – Deep Random Generation:   and   use their respective DRG to pick independently the 
respective probability distributions   and    ( ).  (resp.   ) is then secret (under Deep Random 
assumption) for any observer other than   (resp.  ) beholding all the published information.   (resp. 
 ) calculates a tidying permutation    (resp.    ) of   (resp.   ).    draws the parameter vector 
  {   }  from .   draws the parameter vector   {   }  from  . 
Step 2 – Degradation:     is a public Degradation parameter;   generates a Bernoulli experiment 
vectors   {   }  from the parameter vector    ⁄ .   publishes  .   generates a Bernoulli experiment 
vectors   {   }  from the parameter vector    ⁄ .   publishes  . 
Step 3 – Dispersion:   and   also pick a second probability distribution respectively  and    ( ) 
such that it is also secret (under Deep Random assumption) for any observer other than   (resp.  ).  
is selected also such that ∫  ( )  
 
| | [ | | √   | | √ ]
 
 
 √ 
 in order to ensure that | | is not an 
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unlikely value for  |  ⁄ | (same for   by replacing   by   and   by  ).    (resp.   ) is used to 
scramble the publication of the tidying permutation of   (resp.  ).   (resp.  ) calculates a 
permutation   [ ] (resp.    [ ]) representing the reverse of the most likely tidying permutation on   
(resp.  ) to produce   (resp.  ). In other words, with  ,   [ ] realizes : 
   
    
∫ ( | )      
  ( )  
 
 
 
Then   (resp.  ) draws a boolean   {   } (resp.   ) and publishes in a random order (     )  
  (  [ ]   ), (resp. (       )   
  (   [ ]    )) where   represents the transposition of elements in 
a couple. 
(we remark that it is possible to publish only (  (  )   (  )) and (   (  )    (  )) rather than 
(     ) and (       ), which leads to quantity of bits of    instead of       ). 
Step 4 – Synchronization:   (resp.  ) chooses randomly    (resp.   )  among (       ) (resp. 
(     )). 
Step 5 – Advantage Distillation:   calculates    
  
  ( )  
  ( )
 
,   calculates 
   
  
  ( ) 
  
  ( )
 
.    and    are then transformed respectively by   and   in binary output thanks 
to the sampling method: 
  ̃  ⌊
(    )√  
 
⌋      ,   ̃  ⌊
(    )√  
 
⌋       
(where   is a translation parameter randomly picked in [  
  
√  
[ at each instance of the protocol). The 
multiplicative factor   is chosen such that: 
 
√  
 
 
√  
 
 
 
 
(  is picked according to Proposition 8 (iii)). We introduce the following notations corresponding to 
the canonical form of the opponent strategy to estimate    (obtained in Proposition 9): 
  (           )  
  ((∑        (  ) ) (∑        (  ) )  (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ) (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ))
  
 
  ̃(       )  ⌊
(  (           )   )√  
 
⌋       
   {  ̃( 
 
    )    ̃( 
 
    )    ̃( 
 
    )    ̃( 
 
    ) } 
where     is the permutation chosen by   among (     ) as    and     is the permutation chosen by 
  among (     
 
 ) as   . The partners discard then the instance of the protocol if |  |   . 
Step 6: classical Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification (IRPA) techniques then lead to 
get accuracy as close as desired from perfection between estimations of legitimate partners, and 
knowledge as close as desired from zero by any unlimited opponent, as shown in [4]. 
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The choice of the parameters (       ) will be discussed in proof of main Theorem. They are set to 
make steps 5 and 6 possible, which is the main achievement of this work. 
The protocol can be heuristically analyzed as follows: 
Regarding the legitimate partners: 
(1) when   picks       and   picks        (  ⁄  of cases), the choice of    and    remain 
independant from    , so that   and   remain draws of independent Bernoulli random variables, 
then allowing to apply Chernoff-style bounds with accuracy  (
 
√  
) ( [(  |      
 
  |     )
 
]
 
 ⁄
  (
 
√  
) as shown in Proposition 4 (ii) in Annex 1). 
(2) When   picks       [ ] and/or   picks      [ ] (  ⁄  of cases), the Chernoff bound no 
longer applies and instead, and    or    become erratic, which will lead to an error probability 
of   ⁄ . 
On the other hand, the discarding condition |  |    forced at step 5 imposes that the opponent has no 
better choice than to choose its bit   ̃ randomly within {   } with 50% chance. Thus, as soon as we 
can prove that condition |  |    and condition (1) above coexist with a fair probability   , we have 
shown that an Advantage is created for the partners over the opponent. This fact is proven in Theorem 
1. The main argument of the proof is that, in the estimation   (           ) of    by opponent, the 
opponent’s choices among (     [ ]) for     and among (       [ ]) for     are indistinguishable 
under Deep Random Assumption, and therefore the choice (       )  (      ), which has a fair 
occurrence probability (3/4), leads to opponent’s erratic behavior creating a fair occurrence probability 
that condition |  |    and condition (1) above coexist. 
 
Below we explain the role of each step: 
The Degradation transformations   
 
 
 and   
 
 
 with     at step 2 are necessary so that 
  [ ](  )    (  ) (resp.    [ ](  )     (  )). If    , then     and     and this would cause 
  [ ](  )    (  ) (resp.    [ ](  )     (  )). 
The Deep Random Generation at step 1 prevents the use of Bayesian inference based on the 
knowledge of the probability distribution. In particular, if     (resp.      ) were not managed by 
Deep Randomness,   would be able discriminate    among (     ) (resp.     among (       )) by 
Bayesian inference. 
Dispersion step 3 mixes    within (     ) with another permutation   [ ] (and     within (       ) 
with another permutation    [ ]).   is entirely determined by | | and a permutation, which explains the 
constraint and transformation applied on   in step 3 to make    and   [ ] indisguishable knowing   
(same with    [ ],    , and  ).   [ ] is (1) indistinguishable from    knowing 
   {    (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 )}, and (2) causes that   [ ]
  ( ) and   
  ( ) behave very differently 
due to the fact that   [ ]
  ( ) only depends on | |; indeed we remark that         [ ( )]
     
  [ ]
  , and therefore,   [ ]
  ( ) is stable by action of    on  . (resp.    [ ]
  ( ) only depends on 
| |). That indistinguishability can be expressed under Deep Random assumption by the symmetry    
associated to the group {    } (  being the transposition of pairs) applied to (     ) and ( 
 
   
 
 ). 
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Associating    with other symmetries presented in the proof of Theorem 1, we manage to show that 
the best strategy of the opponent under Deep Random assumption to estimate    and then as a 
consequence   ̃, are:  
  (           )  
  ((∑        (  ) ) (∑        (  ) )  (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ) (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ))
  
 
  ̃(       )  ⌊
(  (           )   )√  
 
⌋       
where     is the permutation chosen by   among (     ) as    and     is the permutation chosen by 
  among (     
 
 ) as   . 
The synchronization step 4 is designed to overcome the Independence Phenomenon. It needs that the 
distributions to have special properties (  ( )) in order to efficiently play their role. It is efficient in 
  ⁄  of cases (when   picks       and   picks       , which we will call ‘favorable cases’). If 
   and     were chosen randomly by   and   instead of being the respective tidying permutations of 
  and   , then   could, even without knowing    and   , use     (   )  
 | || |
  
 in order to estimate 
say    with accuracy  (
 
√  
), in which case   ̃  [
(      )√  
 
] would be as close to   ̃ as   ̃ in 
favorable cases. 
The step 5 is called Advantage Distillation because at this step, thanks to the discarding condition 
|  |   , we have managed to create, under Deep Random Assumption, a protocol in which the error 
rate for the legitimate receiver is strictly lower than the error rate for the opponent. 
We remark that the condition |  |    plays also another role which is to protect against the 
unexpected predictability effects of using an error correcting code at Reconciliation phase. Indeed, 
unlike QKD protocols (protected by no cloning theorem) or Maurer’s satellite protocol presented in 
[5], in our case the opponent can try the various possible combinations of choice for     and    , and 
compare them in terms of matching a code word. To illustrate the issue, let’s consider the non-optimal 
‘bit repeating’ error correction method described by Maurer in [5]: the codeword     chosen by   can 
only be (       )  or (       )  depending on      or     .   could then publicly discards all 
decoded sequence    that is not (       )  or (       )  and obviously decodes accordingly      
if |  |   , and      if |  |   . In such scenario, if, for one of the instance   within the 
sequence, we have        and    (       ) (or    (       )), then it is clear that the code 
word is (       )  (or (       ) ). This example shows how, even with Deep Randomness 
indistinguishability applied locally to each instance, the opponent can still take advantage of an 
imprudent implementation of the error correcting method to break the secrecy. The condition |  |    
also have the advantage to avoid such predictability flaw. 
Theorem 1. 
Under the Deep Random assumption, (       ) satisfies condition ( ) 
The details of the proof are given in Annex 1. 
We also have with a very similar proof (also found in Annex 1): 
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Theorem 2. 
 (       ) satisfies condition (  ) 
 
Parallel with BB84 
The protocol   presents some interesting similarities with the Quantum Key Distribution protocol 
BB84 presented by Bennet and Brassard in 1984 [3]. 
Let’s first briefly remind the principles of BB84.   is secretly polarizing photons; for each photon, the 
polarization is chosen randomly by   between {      } (right polarization) or between {        } 
(inclined polarization); the choice between right polarization type or inclined polarization type is also 
made randomly by  .   can measure the polarization by choosing a right filter (that will give the good 
answer if the polarization is right), or an inclined filter (that will give the good answer if the 
polarization is inclined). If   chooses the wrong filter, the result of the measurement is random. The 
exact same situation applies for the opponent  . 
The polarization in BB84 can be compared to the Dispersion step in   where 2 indistinguishable 
permutations, associated to a same Bernoulli vector, are published. 
The choice of filter by   (or  ) in BB84, imposed by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, can be 
compared to the Synchronization step in   where   (or  ) has no other choice, as per Deep Random 
Assumption, than choosing randomly one of the 2 permutations because they are indistinguishable 
knowing the Bernoulli vector. 
In case of wrong choice of filter, the measurement step in BB84 will result into a random result for the 
measuring party. Similarly, the choice of the wrong permutation (   instead of   ) in the 
Synchronization step, can be shown (see Annex 1 for the detailed proof of Theorem 1) to result into 
erratic variable. However, in  , it is necessary that both partners make the good choice to avoid 
random behavior, although in BB84, it is sufficient that they make the same incline choice, whatever it 
is. 
Then the protocols differ because BB84 can more easily exploit the partial independence created 
between choices of   and   thanks to the no-cloning theorem. Indeed,   can publicly disclose its filter 
choice so that   can publicly discard the wrong choices;   will not be able to exploit this information 
because it cannot redo another measurement on a ‘copy’ of the polarized photon. Contrariwise BB84, 
  only manipulates conventional digital information, that can be copied and accessed anytime by the 
unlimited opponent. Therefore, the discarding condition |  |    is used to distill an Advantage. 
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IV. Discussion about Deep Random generation 
In the present Section, we discuss methods to generate Deep Random from a computing source. It may 
appear as a impossible at first sight to generate Deep Random from a deterministic computable 
program. In the real world, even a computer may access sources of randomness whose probability 
distribution is at least partly unknown, but it doesn’t mean that we can build from it Deep Random 
reliable for cryptographic applications. 
Generation process and strategies 
We present a theoretically valid method to generate Deep Random from a computing source. That 
method mainly relies on infinite counters     as unpredictable randomness source, associated with a 
Cantor’ style diagonal constructing argument. 
If one doesn’t know the date of beginning and the speed of an infinite counter, no probability 
distribution can be even approximated about the value of the counter at a given time, because of the 
unlimited nature of a counter. If performed in a physical computing source, the actual speed of the 
counter is impacted by all external tasks of the processor, for which no probability distribution can be 
estimated; the only thing that an opponent can do is estimate a rough upper bound of that speed, 
which, as we will see, is far from being enough to breach the Deep Randomness of the proposed 
method, and thus to break the secrecy of a protocol such as the one presented in Section III. 
We have introduced in Section I the principle of continuous and recursive constructing process, 
designed in association with a given ITSP. At each step    , the generator emulates the ITSP 
internally and picks (through classical randomness) a new couple of distributions  ( )  
     
 ( )   ( ) that defeats the best possible strategy knowing all the past distributions for    , 
which is always possible for an ITSP as given by condition (  ). In this Section, we will present 
rigorously a method based on that principle applied to the protocol  presented in Section III. 
Let’s consider a strategy   of the opponent to estimate   . As explained in the proof of Theorem 2 
presented in Annex 1,  depends only on (   ) and not on (             ). 
When emulating the protocol, we will thus also place ourselves in the situation   where the legitimate 
partners make both the good choice of permutation 
  [(      )  (     )] 
If the protocol now executes with a same given distribution       on both sides of   and  , we will 
denote: 
〈   〉   [(    )
 | ]
 ∑∫ ( (   )
 
     
 
  
  ( )    
  ( )
 
)
 
  (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)  ̃( )(  
  ( )) ̃( )(  
  ( ))    
 ∑∫ ( (  ( )   ( ))  
   
 
)
 
  (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)  ̃( )( ) ̃( )( )    
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Let’s consider    { [  |   ]|  ( )     }. By definition of { [  |   ]|  ( )     }, there 
exists a distribution        such that     [  |   ]  . It has been shown in the proof of 
Theorem 2 that there exists a distribution        , such that  
〈       〉  
  ( )
  
 
Let’s present first a heuristic argument. With an infinite counter privately executed by a DRG, the 
moments   and     are indistinguishable for the opponent  . If a best winning strategy at the 
moment   exists for  , then by choosing at moment     the probability distribution      
verifying the inequality above, the DRG guarantees that no absolute winning strategy exist, because 
moment of observation cannot be determined by opponent as rather being  or   . 
This heuristic argument does not explain how to practically build a Deep Random generator with 
classical computing resources, but it introduces the diagonal constructing process inspired from non-
collaborative games’ theory. Of course, no Nash’ style equilibrium can be found as the DRG is 
continuously deviating its distribution strategy to avoid forecast from opponent. 
Another interesting remark at this stage is that, in the proof of Theorem 2, we highlighted low entropy 
subsets of probability distributions (typically {   |     }) in which a distribution can always be 
found to scramble a given strategy  . Such subsets have entropy of order  (    ) although the 
whole set of possible strategies { (   )} has an entropy of order  (  ), which is not manageable by 
classical computing resources. 
Let’s now explicit a constructing process, inspired from the above heuristic argument. 
Let’s first consider the two following recursive constructing process: 
Process 1 : 
   is a distribution in      ̃( ( )). In the following, we will simply write  ( ) instead of  ̃( ( )) 
for more simplicity. At step : 
i)  ̂  is performing a minimum value of    〈    〉 which is  [  |   ]   
ii)      is chosen in  ( )  
iii)      in chosen such that 〈 ̂           〉  
  ( )
  
 which is always possible as per 
proof of Theorem 2 
iv)                
 
Process 2: 
   is a distribution in  ( ); at step : 
i)  ̂  is performing a minimum value of    〈  
 
 
∑   
 
   〉 
ii)      is chosen in  ( )  
iii)      in chosen such that 〈 ̂           〉  
  ( )
  
 which is always possible as per 
proof of Theorem 2 
iv)                
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The process 1 involves fast variations, but, if the choice of      and      is deterministic at each 
step , it can have short period (typically period of 2), which makes it unsecure. The process 2 has no 
period but its variations are slowing down when   is increasing. We can justify that the process 2 has 
no period by seeing that, if it would have a period, then 
 
 
∑   
 
    would converge, which would 
contradict the fact that 〈 ̂      〉  
  ( )
  
 〈 ̂    〉   (
 
  
) as shown in Proposition 6 of 
Annex 1. 
Thus, by combining the two process, we get a sequence with both fast variations and no periodic 
behavior. A method to combine both process is the following: 
The Recursive Generation Process: 
   is a distribution in  ( ) ; at step  : 
i)  ̂  is performing a minimum value of    〈    〉 
ii)  ̂   is performing a minimum value of    〈  
 
 
∑   
 
   〉 
iii)      and      are chosen in  ( )  
iv)      is chosen such that 〈 ̂           〉  
  ( )
  
 which is always possible as per 
proof of Theorem 2 
v)       is chosen such that 〈 ̂              〉  
  ( )
  
 which is always possible as 
per proof of Theorem 2 
vi)                    (      )            where      [   ] can be 
picked randomly 
Such a process is secure « against the past », even if the choices at each step are deterministic, but it is 
not secure « against the future » if the choices at each step are deterministic. Being secure « against the 
future » means that if the opponent runs the recursive process on its own and is « in advance » 
compared to the legitimate partner, it still cannot obtain knowledge about the current value of   . So, 
for the process to remain secure also against the future, it is necessary that the choices at each step 
involve randomness (but not necessarily Deep Randomness) with maximum possible entropy among 
 ( ). 
It is also important that the DRG is capable to pick at each step a new distribution within the widest 
possible sub-set of  ( ), otherwise, any restriction in such possible ‘picking set’ would add prior 
information for the opponent about the possible distribution, and would therefore reduce     ( ). 
To that regards, it can be noted that, in the above algorithm, the distribution      (resp.      ) can 
actually be chosen tidied in    (e.g.      (  )        (  )    ) because anyway it is further 
recomposed by a permutation      (resp.      ). From there, we also remark that one can reduce the 
entropy of choosing a new distribution tidied in    by observing that, for any such distribution   and 
for any            ̅, a partner has no reason to choose   rather than      , and therefore any 
such distribution can be considered of the form: 
     
{
 
 
 
 
 
((  ⁄ ) )
 ∑      
     
     ̅̅ ̅
|   ( )
}
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Then, by denoting 
  (   )  ∫  ( )  
 
| |  |  
| |  ̅̅ ̅|  
 
it is clear with a bit of attention that: 
 
((  ⁄ ) )
 ∑      
     
     ̅̅ ̅
( )  
  
(
  ⁄
| |  |
) (
  ⁄
| |  ̅|
)
  (| |  | | |  ̅|) 
and thus      is isomorph to a subset of the 2 dimensional set: 
{     ⁄  [   ] | ∑  (   )
       ⁄
  } 
The exact subset is conditioned by the constraint   ( ). Let’s express this exact subset. By Lemma 
1, we know that, for   ( ) 
∫ (
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
 
 ( ) ( )    
 
{   } 
  ( )   (
 
 
) 
Now, if  also belongs to      we can directly calculate the left term and obtain: 
∫ (
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
 
 ( ) ( )    
 
{   } 
 ( ∑
(   ) 
  
  (   )
       ⁄
)
 
  (
 
 
) 
Finally, we obtain the simpler expression of      that clearly represents      a 2-dimensional set 
with reduced entropy of  (  ): 
     
{
 
 
 
 
 ( )  
  
(
  ⁄
| |  |
) (
  ⁄
| |  ̅|
)
  (| |  | | |  ̅|)|      ⁄  [   ] ∑
(   ) 
  
  (   )
       ⁄
 √ ( )   (
 
 
)
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
Argument about the minimum number of steps to reach the maturity period of the Recursive 
Generation Process 
We consider a convex and compact subset   of possible strategies for the opponent (for any subset, its 
closed convex envelop corresponds to that characteristic). We consider in the followings the sequence 
of probability distributions {  }     constructed as follows : 
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where  is a sleeked distribution in  ( ) as defined in Annex 2 (Proposition 12), called the seed of the 
sequence. This time  ̂  is performing a minimum value in: 
   
   
 
 
∑〈    〉
 
   
 
     is chosen such that: 
〈 ̂      〉  
  
 
 
which is always possible, as stated by Theorem 3 (introduced and proved in Annex 2). 
Diagonal Sequence Property. 
There exists two constants    and     such that, for any   verifying  
 
   ( )
      ( ), 
   
   
 
 
∑〈    〉
 
   
 
   
 
 
  
More precisely, we chose     as : 
     
 
 
(      )                                                  (    ) 
where    is a permutation such that 〈 ̂      〉  
  
 
 as allowed by Theorem 3 (i). 
Let’s set: 
 ̂ (   ̂ )  
 
 
∑〈    〉
 
   
 
 
 
∑〈 ̂    〉
 
   
 
 ̂  
 
 
∑〈 ̂    〉
 
   
 
〈    〉    (    )     
 ̂  and    are positive quadratic forms over     derived by respective distributions 
 
 
∑   ( )  ( )
 
    and   ( )  ( ). (    ) ensures that  ̂  and    are non-degenerate in  . By 
considering a basis that is simultaneously  ̂ -orthonormal and   -orthogonal, we obtain the 2 
following relations (remind that  ̂  is the minimum over the quadratic form  ̂ ): 
 
 
∑〈    〉
 
   
 
 
 
∑〈 ̂    〉
 
   
 ‖   ̂ ‖ ̂ 
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|〈      〉  〈 ̂      〉|   √    ( )‖   ̂ ‖ ̂  
 
We have then: 
 
   
∑〈    〉
   
   
 
 
   
( ̂  (
 
 
∑〈    〉
 
   
 
 
 
∑〈 ̂    〉
 
   
))
 
 
   
(〈      〉  〈 ̂      〉)  
 
   
〈 ̂      〉                       (    ) 
Applying the 2 above relations to (    ), we get: 
 ̂    
 
   
 ̂  
 
   
‖   ̂ ‖ ̃
  
 √    ( )
   
‖   ̂ ‖ ̃  
 
   
  
  
 
 
   
 ̂  
 
   
  
  
 
   ( )
 (   )
 
where the last inequality is obtained by taking the minimum of 
 
   
   
 √    ( )
   
  over  . 
Let’s consider the recurring sequence: 
(   )         
  
  
 
   ( )
 
 
    ̂  
By recurring argument,  ̂     and thus: 
 ̂  
  
  
    ( ) (
   ( )
 
) 
which achieves the proof.  
If we consider first   as the full set of strategies (e.g. [  
 
 
]
   
), the dimension is     and thus the 
constructing process must be iterated exponential times to reach positive lower bound. On the other 
hand, we make the excessive assumption that the opponent has a full knowledge of the distributions 
chosen by the DRG at each step   (of the sequences {  }   ) to be able to build optimal  ̂ . In 
practice, if we consider the protocol   introduced in Section III, we can see that   has never more 
knowledge about a distribution than a draw of   degraded vector  , which means that we can restrict 
the set of strategies to a subset     with dimension  ( ), and thus the recommended number of 
iterations for a recursive constructing process before being able to trustedly pick a distribution is 
 (   ( )). This result also means that the generated sequence is  ( )-undistinguishable under the 
definition given in Section I, for for  
 
   ( )
      ( ). 
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With the same reasoning than the one of Diagonal Sequence Property, we can obtain a more general 
result (with notations introduced in Lemma 3): 
Generalized Diagonal Sequence Property. 
There exists two constants   ( ) and    ( ) such that, for any   verifying  
 
   ( )
      ( ), 
and for any {       }   ( ) and {         }   ( ), and any permutation    
synchronizing   and    : 
   
   
 
 
∑〈           〉
 
   
 
   
 
 
This result also means that when {       } and {         } are generated by DRGs, from the 
principle of objectivity explained in Section I, an opponent should choose the same strategy at each 
step  , and therefore the above inequality implies that whatever is that strategy, in average we have 
〈           〉    [(     )
 | ]   (   ⁄ ) ; which gives Advantage Distillation for  
 
   ( )
 
     ( ). 
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V. Conclusion and further directions 
We proved that Information Theoretical Security could be reached under Deep Random assumption.  
Let’s remark that when the alphabets  ,   and   introduced in Section I are all equal to {   }, and if 
each digit issued by the protocol is managed independently of the others, then the Security Property: 
  (   )   ( | )   ( | )  (   ) ( )                                       (  ) 
introduced in Section I can equivalently be written as: whatever are       , there exists a set of 
parameters   for the protocol   such that the two conditions above are verified: 
(i)  (    ( (     )    (     )))    
(ii)  (   ( (     )    (     ))  
 
 
)      
where the opponent   is passive, with unlimited access to the public information and with unlimited 
power of storage and calculation;          being estimations of an average digit of information 
exchanged between   and   through   respectively from      . 
The obtained result, apparently contradicting Shannon’s pessimistic theorem, is possible thanks to the 
nature of Deep Randomness, that prevents the use of Bayesian inference from public information, 
because not only draws but also probability distributions themselves are unknown to the beholding 
opponent  . 
We also proposed a method to generate Deep Randomness (Section IV) from classical calculation 
resources, thanks to recursive and continuously executed algorithm, based on Cantor’ style diagonal 
constructing method. 
In this work, our main objective was to expose this new idea and to prove the existence of a working 
protocol. But of course, once done, the next question is: if such protocol exists, what is the best one? 
In cryptology and communication sciences, there exist many criteria of quality for a protocol. We will 
concentrate here on the most critical one for practical implementation which is the burden of 
exchanged data needed to obtain an Information Theoretically secure digit of information.  
Considering a ITSP  , we define 
   ( ) 
as the quantity of digit exchanged by   and   on the main channel through the protocol   so that   
and   can collect their respective value of   and  . 
 
The question raised above comes down to determine the maximum: 
          (
       (  ) 
 (   )
   ( )
) 
The quantity   is called the Cryptologic Limit. It is then a constant in [   ]. The Theorem 1 can then 
be formulated simply as: 
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Theorem: 
Under the Deep Random assumption,     
 
The research of the Cryptologic Limit opens, to my opinion, an interesting field of investigations. 
Empirical research of specifically designed protocols may give rapidly interesting improvements to the 
presently proposed example; estimation of performance can be easily done by simulation rather than 
painful theoretical examination of upper-bounds. But the theoretical full resolution of the cryptologic 
limit question will need new ideas. 
I hope this challenge will create enthusiasm for the largest possible number of curious minds 
interested in cryptology, information theory and communication sciences. 
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VI. Annex 1: Proofs of Theorem 1 & 2 
The Annex contains 4 parts: 
 A first part with basic results regarding Bernoulli random variables (Propositions 1 to 7). 
 A second part with basic results regarding sampled binary random variables (Propositions 8). 
 A third part with preliminary results regarding the approximated behavior of the opponent 
under Deep Random assumption (Propositions 9 and 10). 
 And lastly the proofs of Theorem 1 and 2, corresponding to the properties ( ) and (  ) to be 
satisfied by the protocol  . 
 
Basic results with Bernoulli random variables 
Proposition 1. 
For all   {   } and     
 , stands the relation :     (
 
 
)  ∑     (
 
 
)| |       ( ) 
  Let’s start by expressing the multinomial   (
 
 
) in the basis {  ( )}  {   }  : 
  (
 
 
)  
 
 | |
∑
(  )|   |
 |   |
  ( )    
   
 
 | |
∑
(  )|   |
 |   |
∑    ( )        
    (  )| |∑ (∑ ( 
 
 
)
| |
     )     ( ) 
   (  )| |∑ (∑ (| | | |
  | |
) ( 
 
 
)
 | |
  | | )     ( ) 
   (
 
 
)
| |
∑ (  
 
 
)
| | | |
     ( ) 
We thus have : 
    (
 
 
)  ∑ (
 
 
)
| |
∑ (  
 
 
)
| | | |
     ( ) |      
    ∑ (∑ (
 
 
)
| |
(  
 
 
)
| | | |
     
   
)   ( ) |      
    ∑ (  
 
 
)
| |
(∑ (
 
   
)
| |
     
   
)   ( ) |      
Then : 
∑ (
 
   
)
| |
     
   
   ∑ (
 
   
)
    |  (   )|
     
   
 ∑ ∑ (
 
   
)
  | |
   (   )
|  |  
  (   )  
 (
 
   
)
 
(|   | )∑ (
 
 
)
| |
  (   )  (
 
   
)
 
(|   | )∑ (
 
   
)
 
(|   | )
|   |
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)
 
(|   | ) (
 
   
)
| |    
   
And finally,  
    (
 
 
)  ∑ (
 
   
)
 
(|   | ) (
   
 
)
   
  ( ) |       ∑     (
 
 
)| |       ( )   
 
Proposition 2 gives an Chernoff-style upper bound: 
Proposition 2. 
(i) Tail inequality: for all  , we have the upper bound :        (
 
 
)   
 
  
     
(ii) Central approximation:     | |       , there exists two constants       such 
that :       ( )   (    
 ) (   (  
  
  
))  
 (  
  
 
    
)
 with variance 
    (   ) 
  (i) We can write the quotient: 
       (
 
 )
     (
 
 )
 ∏
(   )(    )
 ((   )   )
 
   
 ∏
  
(   ) 
 (   ) 
  
  
 (   ) 
 
   
 
    (∑(  (  
(   ) 
 (   ) 
)    (  
  
 (   ) 
))
 
   
) 
Considering that  ( )     (   ) is 1-lipschitz over   and increasing, we then conclude easily : 
       (
 
 )
     (
 
 )
    ( ∑
 
 (   ) 
 
   
)   
 
  
     
(ii) We can consider       ( ) as continuous in   by extending    to  ( ). By Stirling formula, 
there exists   such that : 
 ( )  √   
  
 
    (  
 ( )
 
) with  ( )    
On the other hand, we have, by Taylor’s inequality, for any  | |       : 
|   (   )  (  
  
 
)|  
  
 
 (    ) 
 
We then develop       ( ) using the two above inequalities, which gives, by noting       : 
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      ( )  √
 
   (   )
  
 ( )
 
(  
 ( )
 ) (  
 (   )
   )
   ( 
  
   (   )
 
  
   
(
 
  
 
 
(   ) 
)   (  
  
 
    
)) 
There exists two constants       such that : 
√
 
   (   )
  
 ( )
 
(  
 ( )
 ) (  
 (   )
   )
 √
 
    (   )
(   (  
  
  
)) 
   (
  
   
(
 
  
 
 
(   ) 
)   (  
  
 
    
))   
 (  
  
 
    
)
 
which ends the proof. 
  
As a consequence of Propositions 1 & 2, we obtain in Proposition 3 below a Chernoff-style bound for 
the legitimate partners. The classical Chernoff bound results are not efficient at neighborhood of zero 
(which, in our context, is due to the increasing of the degradation parameter  ), this is why we need to 
adapt them. 
In the following,   and   are two partners, owning private parameter vectors    ⁄  and   ⁄  
respectively (where   is a real number parameter   ), and generating vectors   and   respectively 
through Bernoulli random variables from   ⁄  and   ⁄  respectively. 
Proposition 3. 
Let   be a positive integer such that   
  
 
, then we have the following upper bound for the 
legitimate partner evaluation gap (with notations of section II): 
 (|     |    |   )     
 
   
  [  ] 
  We will suppose in the following that     {   } . We then have: 
 (|    [  ]|   |   )  ∑ ∑   (
 
 
) 
     
 
|    [  ]|   
  
 ∑ ∑     (
 
 
)    ( )
 
    
|    [  ]|   
 from Proposition 1. 
and noticing that     ( )  {
 
 
        
    
 : 
 ∑      (
 
 
) 
|    [  ]|   
   
 
   
  [  ] from Proposition 2 (i). 
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(notice also that ((  
  
 
   )  (  
  
 
   ))  ((          )    (       
   ))). We conclude by writing that: 
 [
   
 
|   ]   [
   
 
|   ]  
   
  
 
 (|     |    |   )   (|    [  ]|   |   )   (|    [  ]|   |   ) 
  
Proposition 4 below, gives an upper-bound of gap between the legitimate partners’ respective 
estimations in the favorable cases where (      )  (     ). 
Proposition 4. 
(i)  [(
   
 
 
  
 
)
 
|   ]  
 
  
 
(ii) With the notations of the protocol  ,  [(     )
 |(      )  (     )]  
 
  
 
  (i) By direct calculation: 
 [(
   
 
 
   
 
)
 
|   ]  
 
   
∑    (      
     
 
)
 
   
 
 
  
 
Then (ii) comes from (i) by seeing that: 
 [(     )
 |(      )  (     )]
 ∫ ∑  [(
   
 
 
   
 
)
 
|   ]
    {   } 
 
   [   ] 
    ( ) 
     ( )     
  
Proposition 5 below, gives an upper-bound of gap between estimations of 2 stakeholders in case where 
both partners’ distribution is symmetric.   is symmetric means that       for any permutation 
    . We remind that     (   )  
 | || |
  
. 
Proposition 5. 
  and   are two distributions. If  or   is symmetric, then:   
 [(    (   )  
   
 
)
 
]  
 
  
 
  By direct calculation we get: 
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)   (
  
 
 
  
  
))  
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)  
 (
 
  
(  
 
  
)) 
with 
{
 
 
  ∫      ( )  
 
[   ] 
     ∫      
 ( )  
 
[   ] 
      
  ∫   
  ( )  
 
[   ] 
     ∫   
   ( )  
 
[   ] 
                      
  ∫    ( )  
 
[   ] 
     ∫    
 ( )  
 
[   ] 
                        
 
  
Proposition 6 below confirms the obvious intuition that, if the opponent knows the distributions, then 
at least in the favorable cases, his estimation is at least as good as the one of the legitimate receiver: 
Proposition 6. 
With the notations of Section II, we have :      [(     
   
 
)
 
]   [(
   
 
 
  
 
)
 
]. 
  we write  [(
   
 
 
  
 
)
 
] and simply apply Schwarz inequality: 
 [(
   
 
 
   
 
)
 
]  ∫ ∑ (
   
 
 
   
 
)
 
    {   } 
  (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)
 
   [   ] 
 ( )  ( )    
 ∫ ∑[∫ (
   
 
 
   
 
)
 
  (
 
 
) ( )  
 
 
]
   
  (
 
 
)  ( )  
 
 
 ∫ ∑(∫   (
 
 
) ( )  
 
 
)
   
(
∫
   
   (
 
 ) 
( )  
 
 
∫   (
 
 ) 
( )  
 
 
 
   
 
)
 
  (
 
 
)  ( )  
 
 
 
By remarking that 
∫
   
 
  (
 
 
) ( )  
 
 
∫   (
 
 
) ( )  
 
 
 is of the form  (   ) the result follows. The result also applies 
equivalently to   [(  
 (   )    )
 
]   [(     )
 ] by taking distributions     and        
Lastly, the following is a very simple result for quadratic upper bounds: 
Proposition 7. 
Let   and        be two square-integrable functions,   ]   [, and   be a probability 
distribution function over  , with ∫  ( )  ( )  
 
 
   and ∫  ( )  ( )  
 
 
    (
 
   
)
 
, 
then: 
∫(  ( )  (   ) ( ))  ( )  
 
 
    (  
   
 
√
 
 
)
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  Obvious from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality: 
∫(  ( )  (   ) ( ))  ( )  
 
 
   ∫ ( )  ( )  
 
 
 (   ) ∫ ( )  ( )  
 
 
   ( 
  )∫ | ( )|| ( )| ( )  
 
 
   ∫ ( )  ( )  
 
 
 (   ) ∫ ( )  ( )  
 
 
   ( 
  ) (∫ ( )  ( )  
 
 
)
   
(∫ ( )  ( )  
 
 
)
   
 
  
 
Basic results on sampled binary random variables 
The following propositions is useful to establish independence of binary random variables when they 
are generated by sampling from 2 independent random variables with value in an Euclid space, 
typically   and      [ | ]. We denote   the sampling function: 
  ( )  ⌊
 
 
⌋       
where   is a real number such that      . 
Proposition 8. 
Let    and   be 2 independent random variables with values in [   ]. Let also   be a random 
variable independent of   and  , and equi-distributed over [    [. Then: 
(i) the variable      (     )   (   ) is independent of the variable    
  (   ). 
(ii) If |   |   , then  [  (   )   (   )|     ]  
|   |
 
 
(iii) Let     ,      be two real positive numbers, and   be a random variable, 
independent of   and  , and distributed according to the distribution  ( )   
   
(   )
  
  
 over   [      ]; then 
 [  (   )   (   )|   ]  
 
 
  (
    
(   )|   |
) 
(iv) If  [(   ) ]       and    |   |     , then 
 [  (   )   (   )]       [    ⁄ ] ((
 
 
 
    
(   ) 
)
     
     
) 
  (i) Let’s denote  ( ) and  ( ) the respective distributions of   and   over [   ]. We also denote 
the set: 
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  ⋃ [(    )     [
   
 
  
  ⋃ [    (    ) [
   
 
In order to establish independence between    and   , we can write  ((    )    (    )) and 
 (    ): 
 ((    )    (    ))  ∫ ∫  ((      
 )    (        
 ))  ( ) ( )      
 
     
  
   
 
 (    )  ∫ ∫  ((      
 )    (        
 )) ( ) ( )      
 
     
  
   
 ∫ ∫  ((      
 )    (        
 )) ( ) ( )      
 
     
  
   
 
By doing the change of variable    (   )       on the second term of the right side of the 
above equality, we get 
 (    )    ((    )    (    )) 
And of course we have 
 
 
  (    ), which means eventually that 
 ((    )    (    ))   (    ) (    ) 
(ii)   can be considered as equidistributed over [    (   )      (   )   [ because   (   ) 
  (   ) is unchanged by translation of  . Then the result is obvious by observing that   need to be 
within [    (   )     (   )[ so that   (   )   (   )   . 
(iii) We can write: 
 [  (   )    (   )|   ]  ∫  [  (   )    (   )|     ] ( )  
   
  
 ∫ (
|   |
 
 ⌊
|   |
 
⌋) ( )  
   
  
 
 
|   |
   
(   )
∫ (  ⌊ ⌋)  
|   |
  
|   |
   
 
with the change of variable   
|   |
 
. We remark, by considering the surface covered by the function 
 ( )    ⌊ ⌋ over [
|   |
   
 
|   |
  
], that: 
 
|   |
   
(   )
∫ (  ⌊ ⌋)  
|   |
  
|   |
   
 
 
 
  (
    
(   )|   |
) 
(iv) Let’s remark first that, for a variable   [   ] such that  [ ]     , we have, for any 
    : 
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 [ ]    ∫   (   )
 
 
 ∫   (   )
 
 
   (   )   (   (   )) 
which implies that 
 (   )  
   
   
                                                    (    ) 
We can then apply(    ) to   |   |  and write: 
 [  (   )    (   )]  (
 
 
 
    
(   ) 
) (|   |   )  (
 
 
 
    
(   ) 
)
 [|   |]   
   
 
We can conclude by seeing that  [|   |]    [|   |  ⁄ ]   [(   ) ]  ⁄     ⁄ . 
  
 
Considerations on the opponent’s strategy 
The following propositions justify the form of the canonical strategy. 
For     {   } , we denote      is the sub-group of    that let stable    ,    ,̅  ̅    and  ̅   :̅ 
     {    | {   }      { ( )  ( )}     }. We remind that the notation   ̅ designates the 
complement of   in {   } , and the notation | | designates the cardinality of  . If   is a hidden 
distribution generated by  ’s Deep Random Generator, and if the observer only knows   , the assumed 
value of a synchronization permutation    of  and   issued from a Bernoulli trial of parameter vector 
  generated by , all happen for the observer as if   would perform the sequence below: 
        
        ( )
→          
 
   
At the first step     is generated by a certain distribution      (synchronized on   ), at second step 
      (   ) corresponds to a mixing simultaneously within     
  ( ),       ( )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,   ̅   
  ( ), 
and   ̅     ( )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and at third step,   produces the final  . The resulting distribution to be considered is 
denoted: 
  (   )  
 
|      ( )|
∑         
  
        ( )
 
 
|  (  )  |
∑       
    
    (  )  
 
In the following,  |  designates the restriction of the vector   to its components having their index 
within  . 
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Proposition 9. 
 ,    being two permutations,     being the two observable vectors in {   }, and  ̂ (   ) (resp. 
 ̂ ( 
    )) being a distribution that is symmetric within the segments  (  )   ,  (  )   ,̅ 
 (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   , and  (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅    ̅(resp.   (  )   ,   (  )   ,̅   (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   , and   (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   )̅. Then we have 
the canonical form approximation: 
 [
   ( )      ( )
  
|   ]
 ̂ (  )  ̂ ( 
   )
 
  
  
((   ( )    )(  
  ( )    )  ( 
  ( )    ̅)(  
  ( )    ̅))   (
 
  
) 
  The set of distributions verifying symmetry within the segments  (  )   ,  (  )   ,̅  (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   , and 
 (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅    ̅are exactly these of the form: 
 ̂ (   )  
 
|      ( )|
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        ( )
 
 
|  (  )  |
∑        
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From Bayes: 
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   {   }   
        ( )
  
   
   ( )
 
In all the following, in order to simplify notations, we will generically calculate 
 [
   
  
|   ]
 ̂ (   )  ̂ ( 
    )
 
with assumption that          , and  ̂ (   ) will be then more shortly denoted   ( ). The 
above equality shows how to transpose the generic calculation to the desired result. 
We introduce the following subsets of {   } : 
    ̅    ̅        ̅     ̅           
           {       } 
          ̅   {       } 
and the restricted distributions: 
    ( )( |  )  (∫   |  ̅̅̅̅
(
 |  ̅̅ ̅
 
)  ( )( )  |  ̅̅ ̅
 
 |  ̅̅̅̅
) (∫   |  ̅̅̅̅
(
 |  ̅̅ ̅
 
)  ( )( )  |  ̅̅ ̅
 
 
) 
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Let   be any permutation invariant over   ̅, then it is clear that        , and therefore   ( )( ( ))  
  ( )( ). Consequently,        ( )( |  ) are distributions that are symmetric over respectively 
 |  . By splitting the sum of the scalar product     as ∑ ∑         
 
   , we obtain: 
 [
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 )
 
 
  
∑
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 |   |   {   }
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(    ) 
We can easily see that  |   {    } and  |   {    } depending on  . By replacing  |   (resp.  |  ) 
by its value in {    } in each fraction of the sum of the last term of (    ), we can apply Proposition 
10 to each fraction and we obtain the result (   and    being the only segments where  |     and 
 |     simultaneously).  
Proposition 10. 
where ̅  and ̅  are symmetric distribution over {   } , we have: 
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 | || |
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) 
  we keep notations of Proposition 9. By considering      the subgroup of    whose permutations let 
            stable, ̅  and ̅  are obviously invariant by action of    , and thus we can write: 
 
  
∫      (
 
 )  (
 
 )  ̅
( ) ̅ ( )    
 
   {   } 
∫   (
 
 )   (
 
 )  ̅
( ) ̅ ( )    
 
   {   } 
 
 
  
∑∑(
∫     (
 
 )  ̅
( )  
 
  {   } 
∫   (
 
 )  ̅
( )  
 
  {   } 
)(
∫     (
 
 )  ̅ 
( )  
 
  {   } 
∫   (
 
 )  ̅ 
( )  
 
  {   } 
)
    
 
   
 
 
 
  
∑
 
|  |
(
∫       (
 
 )  ̅
( )  
 
  {   } 
∫   (
 
 )  ̅
( )  
 
  {   } 
)(
∫       (
 
 )  ̅ 
( )  
 
  {   } 
∫   (
 
 )  ̅ 
( )  
 
  {   } 
)
 
   
 (     ) 
Let’s study the first bracket. For   {   }, due to the fact that    {   }: 
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For   {   }: 
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  being a constant that we will calibrate appropriately. We also denote: 
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      | |} 
  ̅̅ ̅̅  {(   )| |   
 
 ⁄   | |}    
Thanks to Proposition 1, we can upper-bound the difference: 
|
∫ (| |   | |)  (
 
 )  ̅
( )  
 
  {   } 
∫   (
 
 )  ̅
( )  
 
  {   } 
|  
∑ | | | |  | |  (
 
 )  | |  
 
 ⁄   | |
  (   )| |
∑  | |  | |  (
 
 )  | |  
 
 ⁄   | |
  (   )| |
 
∑ | | | |  | |  (
 
 )  | |  
 
    
 ∑ | | | |  | |  (
 
 )  | |  
 
    ̅̅ ̅̅
∑  | |  | |  (
 
 )  | |  
 
    
 
√    | | ∑  | |  | |  (
 
 )  | |  
 
    
      
∑  | |  | |  (
 
 )  | |  
 
    
 
  √    | |                                                                                                                     (     ) 
if   is calibrated such that: 
  
 
    √    | | ∑  | |  | |  (
 
 
)  | |  
 
    
                                   ( ) 
This is always possible as soon as | |   ; and when   (resp.   ) is sufficiently regular (typically by 
being transformed by a permutative sleeking transform introduced in Annex 2), there exist a constant 
  such that: 
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  | |  
 
 
 
Therefore, there exist a constant      such that 
∑  | |  | |  (
 
 
)  | |  
 
    
  | |  | | (
 
 
)  | |  
  
 √ 
 
and thus ( ) implies that    (   ). 
By injecting the upper-bounds obtained at (     ) in (     ), we finally get the expected result. 
  
Proposition 9 means in all cases, 
  (           )  
  ((∑        (  ) ) (∑        (  ) )  (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ) (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ))
  
 
is the unique canonical approximation strategy for the opponent (where     is the permutation chosen 
by the opponent among (     ) and     is a permutation chosen by the opponent among ( 
 
   
 
 )). 
 
Proof of Theorem 1 and 2 
The quadratic matrix    introduced in Section I is a symmetric matrix with elements in [   ]. For 
such matrix, we define the permutation as,      : 
 (  )       {  ( ( )  ( ))}    {   } 
and the scalar product, in the vector space of     matrix: 
         (     )  ∑   (   )   (   )
    {   }
 
We can now explicit the Separable Criteria lemma. This lemma is a useful tool to build probability 
distributions that are not sensitive to the Independence Phenomenon introduced in Section I. The 
notations are the one introduced in Section III. 
 
Lemma 1. (Separable Criteria lemma) 
For 2 probability distributions   and    in  ( ), and for any      [    ⁄ ], we then have 
the inequality: 
 [( (| | | |)  
   
  
)
 
]
 ̃( ) ̃(  )
 
  
   
  (
 
   
)  
 ( )
  
 
  We introduce the quadrant sum, for      {   }: 
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     (   )  
 
 
(   ( )       ( )) (   ( 
 )
      ( 
 ))
 
|   |
 ∑ (
      
   ( )          
  
  
( )
 
)
 
      
 
     (    )  ∫      (   ) ( )  ( )    
 
   {   } 
 
 
   
(   ( )       ( )) (   ( 
 )       ( 
 ))
 
|   |
 ∑       
   (  )
      
         
  
  
(   ) 
By using the trivial inequality     [   ]  (   )  
 
 
(     ) , we can write: 
 [( (| | | |)  
   
  
)
 
]
 ̃( )  ̃(  )
 
 
  
∑ ∫ (  (| | | |)  
   
 
)
 
 (   |   ) ̃( )( ) ̃(  )( )    
 
   {   }     {   } 
 
 
   
∑ ∫ (   (| | | |) 
 
   {   }     {   } 
 (
   
 
)
 
)
 
 (   |   ) ̃( )( ) ̃(  )( )     
By applying Schwarz inequality, and observing that (i) (   | ( )  ( ))   (   ( )    ( )|   ) 
       , (ii)  (| ( )| | ( )|)   (| | | |)        , and (iii) (
           
 
)  (
       
 
)
 
, we 
get from the above inequality: 
 [( (| | | |)  
   
  
)
 
]
 ̃( )  ̃(  )
 
 
   
∫ (   (   )     (   )     (   )
 
   {   } 
    (   ))
 
 ( )  ( )     
 
 
   
(   (   
 )     (   
 )     (   
 )     (   
 ))
 
     (    ) 
For any     , we observe the 3 following stability properties: 
(i) for any (   )        , {    | ( )   
    ( )    }(     )         is an equi-partition of 
  , which then implies: 
 
|  |
∑   ( ( )  ( ))
    
 
 
 (   )
∑   (   )
     
   
   ( ) 
(ii) for any (   )     ,̅ {    | ( )   
    ( )    }(     )    ̅ is an equi-partition of   , which 
then implies : 
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|  |
∑   ( ( )  ( ))
    
 
 
  
∑   (   )
       ̅
   ( ) 
(iii) for any    , {    | ( )   
 }     is an equi-partition of  , which then implies: 
 
|  |
∑   ( ( )  ( ))
    
 
 
 
∑  (   )
   
   ( ) 
Applying the 3 stability properties above to the calculation of      (    ), we obtain the following 
block matrix: 
     (    )  
 
     
((
   ( )   ( )   ⁄
  ( )   ⁄    ̅( )
)  (
   ̅( )   ( )   ⁄
  ( )   ⁄    ( )
))
 ((
   (  )    (  )   ⁄
   (  )   ⁄    ̅(  )
)  (
   ̅(  )    (  )   ⁄
   (  )   ⁄    (  )
)) 
where   ( ) and    ⁄  designate the   ⁄  block matrix: 
  ( )  (
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
)  and    ⁄  (
   
   
   
) 
The matrix scalar product above can also be written: 
     (    )  
 
  
(
  
 
(
   ( )     ̅( )
 
)(
   (  )     ̅(  )
 
)  
  
 
  ( )   (  )  ( )) 
then: 
|   (    )     (    )     (    )     (    )|  
 (
 
 
)  
 
 
|  ( )    ( )||  (  )    (  )| 
which we can inject in (    ) with definition of  ( ) to conclude the proof. 
A similar result can be obtained with  [( (| | | |)  
   
 
)
 
]
 ̃( ) ̃(  )
 just using Proposition 7 and the 
fact that  [(
   
 
 
   
  
)
 
]
    
 
 
  
 as shown in Section II.  
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Theorem 1. 
Under the Deep Random assumption, (       ) satisfies condition ( ). 
  The proof is organized as follows: we will first determine a restricted form for the opponent’s 
strategy by considering 3 symmetries applicable to the knowledge of    and then applying accordingly 
the Deep Random Assumption with those 3 symmetries. Then, we will apply that restriction to 
determine the possible strategies of the opponent (phase 1). Then we will show technical inequalities 
applying to the error rates of respectively the legitimate receiver and the opponent (phase 2). At last, 
we will deduce Advantage Distillation from the said inequalities (phase 3). 
The first symmetry   , and also the most important one, results from the fact that   cannot distinguish 
   within (     ), and neither     within (       ) knowing the public information   
{    (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 )}. But nevertheless,    designating the distribution potentially chosen by   in 
the opponent’s perspective, if   consider    ( ) (  {   }) as the choice of   for     then obviously 
   should have    ( ) as its tidying permutation. The first symmetry thus results from the group 
{    } applied to (     ) and ( 
 
   
 
 ). 
The second symmetry    results from the fact that   cannot distinguish the actual distribution among 
all distributions having    ( ) as synchronization permutation and composed with any permutation 
letting stable      ( )(  ),      ( )(  )
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,  ̅     ( )(  ) and  ̅     ( )(  )
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . The induced sub-group of 
   is: 
  
  ( )
(  )   {    | {   }     ( )(  )    { ( )  ( )}     ( )(  )   } 
We remind that the notation   ̅ designates the complement of   in {   } , and the notation | | 
designates the cardinality of  . If   is a hidden distribution generated by  ’s Deep Random Generator, 
and if the observer only knows    ( ) as the assumed synchronization permutation, and   issued from a 
Bernoulli trial of parameter vector   generated by , all happen for the observer as if   would perform 
the sequence below: 
        
        ( )
  ( )
→              
 
  ( )
→     
At the first step     is generated by a certain synchronized distribution      (synchronized on   ), at 
second step       (   ) corresponds to a mixing simultaneously within       ( )
  ( ),    
   ( )
  ( )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,   ̅     ( )
  ( ), and   ̅     ( )
  ( )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , and at third step,    ( ) produces the final  . The 
resulting distribution to be considered is denoted: 
  (     ( ))  
 
|      ( )
  ( )|
∑           ( )
  
        ( )
  ( )
 
 
|  
  ( )
(  )  |
∑         ( )
    
    
  ( )
(  )  
 
The second symmetry thus results from the group   
  ( )
(  )   applied to (     ) or (     ). 
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The third symmetry    results from the fact that the distribution  ̃( ) is entirely defined by a 2 
variables distribution 
      (|  ( )    |    |  ( )    ̅|   ) 
Typically, prior the publication of {    (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 )}, it is legitimate to say that   has no ground 
to privilege      rather than  (   )    (  ⁄   ) (    )    (  ⁄   ),  (    )     ⁄
  and then that group 
of translations drives to a uniform distribution of     . Posteriorly to the publication of 
{    (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 )}, it remains legitimate, due to symmetry   , to say that   should at least only 
consider distributions       such that               where: 
(
    |  ( )    |
    |  ( )    ̅|
)  (
    |  ( )    |
    |  ( )    ̅|
) 
Therefore, a couple of distributions   (    ) and   (       [ ]
     [ ]) transformed by the 
symmetry    to verify the above equality, are denoted  ̂ (    ) and  ̂ (       [ ]
     [ ]). They 
verify the following equalities: 
 (  (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 ))   (  (     ))
 
 
 
(∫   (
 
 
)  ̂ (    )( )  
 
 
 ∫   (
 
 
)  ̂ (       [ ]
     [ ])( )  
 
 
)
 ∫   (
 
 
)  ̂ (    )( )  
 
 
 ∫   (
 
 
)  ̂ (       [ ]
     [ ])( )  
 
 
 
and additionally, the transformations induced by symmetry    maintains the symmetries between the 
components of the vector   within the segments       ( )
  ( ),       ( )
  ( )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,   ̅     ( )
  ( ), 
and   ̅     ( )
  ( )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , and therefore  ̂ (    ) and  ̂ (       [ ]
     [ ]) remains compatible with 
the calculations of Proposition 9. The third symmetry thus results from the group {    } applied to 
({    }{    }
 {    }{       [ ]     [ ]}
). 
Then, for   willing to evaluate    knowing the public information  , the knowledge of the probability 
distribution  (  (      )| ) by   is invariant by action of          under Deep Random 
Assumption, and therefore we can write Bayes formula: 
 (  (      )| )   (  (      )|  (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 ))
 
 (  (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 )|  (      )) (  (      ))
 (  (     ) (     
 
 ))
 
which results in the form   (        ) below (involving the above equalities for the 
 (  (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 )) denominator): 
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  (        )
 {
 
 
(
 
 
(
 
 
)  ̂ (    )( )  
∫   (
 
 
)  ̂ (    )( )  
 
 
    (   )  
 
 
(
 
 
)  ̂ (       [ ]
     [ ])( )  
∫   (
 
 
)  ̂ (       [ ]     [ ])( )  
 
 
    [ ](   ))  (
 
 
(  
  
(  )      [ ](  ))) |      ( )} 
Phase 1: 
Now that we have restricted the possible distributions  (  (      )| ) for the opponent, let’s 
examine the consequence of such restriction on the opponent’s strategy. The best way for   to estimate 
  ̃|  is to compute   ̃( )  {   } verifying: 
    ̃( ) {   } [  ̃  ̃( )]      ̃( ) {   } [(  ̃   ̃( ))
 ] 
This is obtained as follows: 
∫(  ̃   ̃( ))
  (  (      )| )  ∫  ̃ (  (      )| )   ̃( ) (   ∫  ̃ (  (      )| )) 
which gives, as expected: 
( )∫  ̃ (  (      )| )  
 
 
   ̃( )   
(  )∫   ̃ (  (      )| )  
 
 
   ̃( )   
(   )∫  ̃ (  (      )| )  
 
 
   ̃( )                 
 
We remind the notation 
   ( )  ⌊
   
 
⌋       
In the following, we will denote for more simplicity: 
 ( )    √  ⁄  ( ) 
 ̂ (    [ ])   ̂ (       [ ]
     [ ]) 
The restriction of the possible distributions  (  (      )| ) for the opponent enables us to compute 
∫   ̃ (  (      )| ) as follows: 
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∫  ̃ (  (      )| )    (        )
 {
 
 
∫
( (  
  ( )     
  ( ))   (  
  ( )     [ ]
  ( )))   (
 
 )  ̂ 
(    )( )  
∫   (
 
 )  ̂ 
(    )( )  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∫
( (  [ ]
  ( )     
  ( ))   (  [ ]
  ( )     [ ]
  ( )))   (
 
 )  ̂ 
(    [ ])( )  
∫   (
 
 )  ̂ 
(    [ ])( )  
 
 
 
 
|    
  ( )} 
(    ) 
We remind the notation corresponding to the canonical forms obtained in Proposition 9: 
  (           )  
  ((∑        (  ) ) (∑        (  ) )  (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ) (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ))
  
 
  ̃(       )   (  (           )) 
   {  ̃( 
 
    )    ̃( 
 
    )    ̃( 
 
    )    ̃( 
 
    ) } 
where     is the permutation chosen by   among (     ) as     and     is the permutation chosen 
by   among (     
 
 ) as   . 
We need now to justify that we can inverse the operator   and the operator ∫  in each of the terms of 
the equality (    ): for a given choice of (       ), the respective estimations of    and    will be 
(i) or close compared to the filter width  √  ⁄  in which case they they will be close for most of the 
permutations found in the sum  ̂  and therefore it is justified to inverse the operators with 
approximation   ( ); or (ii) not close compared to the filter width  √  ⁄  in which case, by 
considering the independent random variable of the translation parameter  , we will obtain estimations 
close to   ⁄  for   ̃   ̃ in both cases of inversion or non-inversion of the operators (see Proposition 
8 for an example of such reasoning), and thus again the inversion is justified with an approximation 
that can be made as close as desired from zero. 
Then, due to the fact that, at each instantiation   of the protocol, we have forced at step 5 the 
condition 
|  |                                                                             (   ) 
We are in the case (   ) of the computation of ∫(  ̃   ̃( ))
  (  (      )| ), and the opponent 
cannot do better than to choose randomly its bit   ̃(       ) within   . That means that the 
opponent cannot do better than picking its bit at 50% chance random, which means that its knowledge 
is null, at the approximation of Proposition 9. 
The above reasoning is valid because the condition (   ) remains compatible with the symmetries 
         and therefore, discarding the instances that do not verify (   ) does not affect the validity 
of the restriction   (        ) allowed by the Deep Random Assumption. 
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Phase 2: 
In this intermediate phase, we prove technical inequalities related to  (  ̃    ̃| ) and  (  ̃    ̃| ). 
Let’s consider the below situation that happens with a probability 
 
 
 : 
  [(      )  (     )] 
Let’s first consider the case [  ((       )  (      ))]. Thanks to Proposition 6 for the first 
inequality and Proposition 4 (ii) for the second one, we get: 
 [(  (          )    )
 
| ]   [(     )
 | ]  
 
  
                                          (    ) 
Let’s secondly consider the case [  ((       )  (   [ ]   [ ]))]. We remark that       
  [ ( )]
       [ ]
  , and therefore,   [ ]
  ( ) is stable by action of    on  . This also means 
that   [ ]
  ( ) is of the form   [ ]
  ( )   (| |). Similarly,    [ ]
  ( ) is also stable by action of   
on  , and is therefore also of the same form. We also remark that      ,   ( ) ( )          
   
and therefore, thanks to the above, we can deduce that the distribution   (    [ ])    [ ] is invariant 
by the transform       ( ). 
The considerations above applied to   (       [ ]   [ ]) imply that 
          ( ( )  ( )   [ ( )]  
 
 [ ( )])    (      [ ]    [ ]) 
Which also means that   (      [ ]    [ ]) is of the form  
  (      [ ]    [ ])   (| | | |) 
In the situation  , the legitimate partners use both at step 4 the 2 tidying permutations    and    . We 
have seen in the definition of tidying permutations that picking a tidying permutation for   means 
choosing randomly and uniformly any possible tidying permutation for  . Therefore, given the form 
  (      [ ]    [ ])   (| | | |), the exact writing of  [(  (      [ ]    [ ])    )
 
| ] is: 
 [(  (      [ ]    [ ])    )
 
| ]
 ∑∫ (  (      [ ]    [ ])
 
     
 
  
  ( )     
  ( )
 
)
 
  (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)  ̃( )(  
  ( )) ̃(  )(   
  ( ))    
 ∑∫ (  (      [ ]    [ ])  
   
 
)
 
  (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)  ̃( )( ) ̃(  )( )    
 
     
 
  [( (| | | |)  
   
  
)
 
]
 ̃( ) ̃(  )
 
  
   
  (
 
   
)  
 ( )
  
                       (    ) 
where the last inequality comes from Lemma 1. 
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Each experiment of the protocol      leads to a binary encoding of   ,   , and thus also   , to obtain 
  ̃  ⌊
(    )√  
 
⌋      ,   ̃  ⌊
(    )√  
 
⌋      ,   ̃  ⌊
(    )√  
 
⌋       
where   is a translation parameter. If   is chosen (publicly by  ) such that 
      |     
  
√  
|  
  
√  
                                                      (   ) 
with 
 
 
   
 
 
 then the inequality (    ) combined with Proposition 3, enables us to obtain: 
 (  ̃    ̃| )   ((     )
  
    
  
| )      
    
                                 (    ) 
The fact to choose   publicly, does not give useful information to   when   is satisfied, because of 
(    ) shown below. 
Thanks to Proposition 8 (iv) combined with (    ) we can determine a constant    such that 
 (  ̃    ̃| )      ( √
 
 
)                                              (    ) 
Due to the (    ) bound compared to the (    ) bound, there is a fair probability (controlled 
especially by the parameter  ) that the conditions (   ) and (   ) coexist. Discarding the instances 
that do not verify (   ) and (   ) is therefore reasonable. 
Phase 3: 
In this phase, we finally show that we create and Advantage for the partners compared to the 
opponent. Due to the exponentially small upper bound of (    ) we can safely assume in the 
following that   ̃    ̃| , which we will also denote   ̃(   )    ̃(  ). 
We obtained at phase 1 that the opponent cannot do better than to choose randomly its bit 
  ̃(       ) within {   } as soon as we impose |  |   . Therefore, it is sufficient to show that there 
exists a constant      such that  (  ̃(   )    ̃(   )    ̃(  )    ̃(  )||  |   )    . Indeed, 
any instance where   ̃(   )    ̃(   ) or   ̃(  )    ̃(  ) will be non-contributive because in such 
case, we have exactly  (  ̃    ̃)    ⁄   (  ̃    ̃). 
Let’s thus show the above inequality: 
From inequality (    ), we can deduce that there exists a constant       such that 
 (|  (      [ ]    [ ])    (   )|  
 
√  
)      
On the other hand, we know that   (          )    (   ) compared to 
 
√  
 (this can be justified by 
using same reasoning than in Proposition 5). Therefore, due to the definition of   (        ), the two 
relations above imply necessarily that: 
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  [ ]( )       ( )    
  
  [ ]( )    ̅    ( )    ̅
  
   [ ]( )        ( )    
  
   [ ]( )    ̅     ( )    ̅
 
By observing that (i) the inversion of    and   ̅ let the protocol unchanged, and (ii) that (       ) and 
(         ) are generated independently, we can conclude that there exists a probability bounded by a 
constant   such that the elements in each pair within 
{  (   )   (          [ ])   (      [ ]    )   (      [ ]    [ ])} 
are distant compared to 
 
√  
. Then, by considering the independent random variables of the translation 
parameter   and the multiplicative factor  , we obtain as desired (similar reasoning than in 
Proposition 8) that there exists a constant       such that  (  ̃(   )    ̃(   )||  |   )     . 
The same reasoning can stand by replacing   (   ) by   (  ), and thus finally, one can determine a 
constant      such that  (  ̃(   )    ̃(   )    ̃(  )    ̃(  )||  |   )    . 
We deduce from that inequality that 
 (  ̃    ̃||  |   )  (    )
 
 
 
while  
 (  ̃    ̃||  |   )  
 
 
  ( ) 
We have therefore created an Advantage for the partners over the opponent. This is enough to 
conclude the proof of the Theorem.  
 
Theorem 2. 
 (       ) satisfies condition (  ). 
  If   is the optimal strategy to estimate    for a known distribution    in    , then the tidying 
permutation    of that distribution is known and the distribution can be assumed that     
   (  )     (  ) {    } because the generator can choose either    or a permuted version      
provided that   keeps    as the tidying permutation. From Proposition 9,  is under the form: 
 (   )  
  
  
((  
  ( )    )(   
  ( )    )  (  
  ( )    ̅)(   
  ( )    ̅))   (
 
  
) 
(Typically, in a recursive DRG generation process,    represents a tidying permutation of the 
distribution generated at step  ). We can justify the fact that   depends only on (   ) and not on 
(             ) by remarking that when   does know the tidying permutation    of the distribution, 
(             ) carry no additional useful information to elaborate  . 
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For more simplicity in writing, we will denote in the following: 
   
 (   )  
  
  
((  
  ( )    )(   
  ( )    )  (  
  ( )    ̅)(   
  ( )    ̅)) 
If the protocol now executes with a same given distribution      ( ) on both sides of   and  , we 
can write: 
 [(    )
 | ]  ∑∫ ( (   )
 
     
 
  
  ( )    
  ( )
 
)
 
  (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)  ̃( )(  
  ( )) ̃( )(  
  ( ))    
 ∑∫ ( (  ( )   ( ))  
   
 
)
 
  (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)  ̃( )( ) ̃( )( )    
 
     
 
It is easy to see that             
     , and therefore,  ̃ is invariant by the change     
 , and thus      : 
 [(    )
 | ]   
 ∑∫ ( (      ( )  
     ( ))  
   
 
)
 
  (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)  ̃( )( ) ̃( )( )    
 
     
 
By summing in average over     , and using Schwarz inequality, we get: 
 
  
∑  [(    )
 | ]   
    
 ∑∫ (
 
  
∑    
 ( ( )  ( ))
    
 
   
 
)
 
  (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)  ̃( )( ) ̃( )( )    
 
     
  (
 
  
) 
By writing    
 (   )  
  
  
(∑      ( )     ( )
 
       ∑      ( )     ( )
 
      ̅
) and distinguishing the 
cases     from    , we obtain with the stability properties introduced in proof of Lemma 1: 
 
  
∑    
 ( ( )  ( ))
    
 
 | || |
  
  (
 
 
) 
And then eventually, via Lemma 1, we get: 
 
  
∑  [(    )
 | ]   
    
 
 ( )
  
  (
 
  
)   (
 
  
) 
As the above inequality is true for the average summing over     , it is in particular true for at least 
a particular     . We can then finish the proof by using the same technique than for Theorem 1 
from the step (    ), with that particular distribution and the above inequality as a replacement of 
(    ).  
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VII. Annex 2: The Permutative Sleeking transform and its application to evaluate Deep 
Random generator maturity period 
The Permutative Sleeking transform 
The permutative sleeking transform is a tool that turn a given probability distribution into a 
« sufficiently regular » one, meaning avoiding brutal variation. 
A permutative sleeking kernel   is a function   
  [   ] (note that it is impossible that | |    and 
thus the component for   can be ignored) that verifies: 
∑  (| |)
    
   
Then, for a given probability distribution , the permutative sleeking transformation of  is: 
    [ ]  ∑  (| |)   
    
 
A simple property of permutative sleeking transformations is the following: 
Proposition 11. 
The space of permutative sleeking transformations, fitted with composition operation, is stable. 
  Let’s first remark that, for any       : 
| |  |       | 
Indeed, if    (    ( )), then   can uniquely be written    ( ) with       ( ). Then     
   ( )     ( )    because  ( )   , which implies that | |  |       |. Reversely, if 
   (    ( )), then   can uniquely be written    (  ) with        ( ), which implies that 
 (  )     and following         ( )     (  )   (  )    ; thus   | |    |       |, 
and finally | |  |       |. 
In addition, it is obvious that                    , and thus by cardinality { || |   }  
{       || |   }      . 
We can then write the composition of two permutative sleeking kernels : 
     [ ]  ∑  (| |)
    
∑  (| |)
    
      ∑
(
 ∑  (| |) (| |)
     
     )
 
    
    
Let’s now show that the coefficient depends only on | | : 
∑  (| |) (| |)
     
     
 ∑  (| |) (|     |)
    
 
Then for any     : 
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∑  (| |) (|           |)
    
 ∑  (| |) (|           |)
    
 ∑  (|       |) (|           |)
    
 ∑  (|  |) (|      |)
    
 
with the change of variable           , that courses the set {  ||  |  | |} as seen above. This 
shows that the coefficient only depends on | |. In addition, obviously : 
∑ ∑  (| |) (|     |)
        
 ( ∑  (| |)
    
)( ∑  (|  |)
     
)    
 which means that       is still a permutative sleeking transformation. 
  
For   a subset of    we define by | | the cardinality of   and    the subgroup of    including 
permutations for which     ( )   . 
We have the following inversion formula for the Permutative Sleeking transform: 
Proposition 12. 
Let   be a function       . Then, if we denote  ( )  ∑  ( )    
| |  
 and  
 ( )  ∑ ∑  ( )     
| |  
, we have the following inversion formulas: 
 ( )  ∑(
   
   
) ( )
 
   
 
 ( )  ∑(  )   (
   
   
) ( )
 
   
 
 
  We have the first relation by: 
 ( )  ∑
(
  
 
∑  
 
| |  
      ( ) )
  
 
 ( )
    
| |  
 ∑ (
  | |
  | |
)  ( )
    
| |  
 ∑(
   
   
) ( )
 
   
 
This formula can be reversed by using the classical matrix inverse: 
(
   
   
(
 
 
)   
)
      
  
 (
   
   
(  )   (
 
 
)   
)
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(which can be easily seen by considering for instance the inverse of the   [ ] endomorphism 
 ( )   (   )). 
By setting        and       , we have (   
   
)  (   
     
)  (  
  
), and thus : 
(
   
   
(
   
   
)   
)
      
  
 (
   
   
(  )   (
   
   
)   
)
      
 
from which we take the reverse formula: 
 ( )  ∑(  )   (
   
   
) ( )
 
   
 
  
 
The Synchronized Strategy Lemma and its application to evaluate Deep Random generator 
maturity period 
We introduce the operator    for 2 distributions    : 
  (    )  ∫ (
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
 
 ( )  ( )     
 
   [   ] 
 
   gives a measure of synchronization between  and  . 
Proposition 13. 
If  and    ( ), then:  
   
    
  (      )  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  and     are then said ‘synchronized’. 
  Let’s simply write: 
   
    
  (      )    ( ̃( )  ̃( 
 )) 
And then, applying Lemma 1 (with  (| | | |)  
| || |
  
 and    ), we get the result.  
 
The following lemma gives a useful calculation method when using distributions transformed by 
permutative sleeking. 
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Lemma 2. 
Let   and    be two probability distributions, and   be a permutative sleeking kernel, then we 
have: 
  (    )  ∑  (| |)
    
∫ (       ( ))
 
 ( )  ( )    
 
   [   ] 
 ∑ ( )  
 (
  
 
  (    )   ( ))
 
   
 
 
  For   a subset of    we define by | | the cardinality of   and    the subgroup of    including 
permutations for which     ( )   . Let’s set: 
 ( )  ∫ (       ( ))
 
 ( )  ( )    
 
   [   ] 
 
 ( )  ∑  ( )
    
| |  
 
 ( )  ∑ ∑  ( )
     
| |  
 
Thanks to Proposition 12, we can write    depending on  ( ) as follows: 
   ∑  (| |) ( )
    
 ∑ ( ) ∑  ( )
    
| |  
 
   
 ∑ ( ) ( )
 
   
 ∑ ( )∑(  )   (
   
   
) ( )
 
   
 
   
                                                               (    ) 
Let’s now calculate  ( ) by using the properties of    as a group (in the following,    
      are 
constants); we will use the notation       (   ) to simplify the writings: 
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 ( )  ∑ ∑ ( ∑ (                
 
  ( )         ( ) ( ))
      
 
)
     
| |  
 ∑ (  ∑          
      
 
  (   ) ∑      
 
    
        
    ∑      
 
   
      
   ̅ 
| |  
 (   ) ∑      
 
     
           
   ∑      
 
   
     ̅
  (    ))
   (
   
   
) ∑          
      
 
 (   ) (
   
   
) ∑      
 
     
            
 
  (   ) (
   
   
) ∑      
 
    
         
 
  (     (
 
 
))
   
 (    (    )  (    )) 
In addition, we have: 
∑(  )       
 (
   
   
)
 
   
   
 ∑(  )   
  
(   ) 
 
   
   
 (
  
 
 
  
 
  ( )) 
and: 
|∑(  )     
 (
   
   
)  (    )
 
   
|      ∑  
 (
   
   
)
 
   
        
  
By injecting the calculation of  ( ) in (    ), we can conclude the proof with the two above relations. 
  
An immediate consequence of lemma 2 is that, if the probability distributions   and     ( ) are 
synchronized, then stands the following inequality: 
  (    )  
  
  
∑ ( )    
 
 
   
  ( ) 
We will also use the following corollary, that relies on the same calculation technique than presented 
in Lemma 2. 
The « border polynomial » is defined by: 
    ( )   (
 
 
  ) (
 
 
  ) (  
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
Corollary 1 (treatment of border conditions). 
For  and    two synchronized probability distributions in  ( ), there exists a constant 
 ( )    (independent from   and   ) and a permutative sleeking transformation  , 
depending on    but not on  and  , such that: 
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∑ ∫  | | | | (
   
 
) | | | | (
   ( )
 
)(
   
 
 
   ( )
 
)
 
 (| |) ( )  [ 
 ]( )    
 
   [   ]     
  ( )∑
  
  
 
   
  
  ( )  
 
√ 
∑
  
  
 
   
  
  ( )   (
 
√ 
) 
   
By using the same calculation technique than in Lemma 2 (we won’t present the details here), we 
obtain more generally that for any polynomial   with degree   , and   [   ], there exists a constant 
     such that : 
 
  
  ∑  (
   ( )
 
)
    
| |   
 
 
 
 ( 
| || |
  
 (   )
   
 
)  (
  ‖ ‖ 
 
)    (    ) 
We have oviously (because | | | | | ( )|    over [   ]) : 
 | | | | (
   ( )
 
)   | | | | (
   
 
)  ( |
   
 
 
   ( )
 
|) 
Let’s apply a first time (    ) to : 
 
  
  ∑ ∫  | | | | (
   
 
) | | | | (
   ( )
 
)(
   
 
 
   ( )
 
)
 
 ( )  ( )    
 
   [   ]     
| |   
 
 
  
  ∑ ∫  | | | | (
   
 
)
 
(
   
 
 
   ( )
 
)
 
 ( )  ( )    
 
   [   ]     
| |   
  
(
 
  
  
  ∑ ∫ (
   
 
 
   ( )
 
)
 
 ( )  ( )    
 
   [   ]     
| |   )
 
 
 
 ⁄
 
  
 
∫  | | | | (
   
 
)
 
(
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
 
 ( )  ( )    
 
   [   ] 
 
 (
   
 
)   (
  
 
  (
    
 
))
 
 ⁄
                                                                    (    ) 
Let’s consider the probability distribution, obtained by the following « Dirac » permutative sleeking 
transformation: 
    
 
  
  ∑     
    
| |   
 
It can be easily remarked that: 
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 | | | | ( 
| || |
  
 (   )
   
 
)    (
| |
 
| |
 
(  
| |
 
)(  
| |
 
))
 
 
By replacing    by     in (    ) and applying a second time (    ) to the first term of the right side 
of the inequality, with the above we obtain: 
∫  | | | | (
   
 
)
 
(
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
 
 ( )   ( )    
 
   [   ] 
 
 
  
  ∑ ∫  | | | | (
   ( )
 
)
 
[(
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
 
   ] ( )  ( )    
 
   [   ]     
| |   
 
  
 
∫ (
| |
 
| |
 
(  
| |
 
)(  
| |
 
))
 
[(
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
  
   [   ] 
   ] ( )  ( )      (
    
 
)                                                                  (    ) 
In addition, as (
| || |
  
 
  
 
)
 
 is unchanged by transformations    ̅ and    ̅ we can write : 
(
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
 
    
 
((
| || |
  
)
 
 ((  
| |
 
)(  
| |
 
))
 
)  
| |
 
| |
 
(  
| |
 
)(  
| |
 
) 
And therefore we can extend  (    ) with Proposition 13 and the above: 
∫  | | | | (
   
 
)
 
(
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
 
 ( )   ( )    
 
   [   ] 
 
  
 
∫ [(
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
  
   ] ( )  ( )    
 
   [   ] 
  (
    
 
)
 
  
 
[  (    )
    ]  (
    
 
)  
  
 
[
   
   
   ]   (
 
 
) 
We can take the maximum over   [   ] which is obtained for    
   
     
 : 
∫  | | | | (
   
 
)
 
(
| || |
  
 
   
 
)
 
 ( )    ( )    
 
   [   ] 
   ( )   (
 
 
) 
By injecting the above in (    ) and remarking that √    √  √        , we obtain the 
result. The permutative sleeking transformation  [  ]  
 
  
   
∑         
| |    
 is indeed only depending 
on  . 
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We introduce the set of strategies  (   ) that are invariant by application of a same permutation on   
and  : 
   {  [   ]
   | ( ( )  ( ))   (   )        } 
One can remark that: 
   {  [   ]
   |      (| | | |    )       
  [   ]} 
Let’s justify this equivalence: 
  it is clear that any strategy of the form  (| | | |    ) is in   . Let   be in   , and let’s consider 
(   ) and (     ) such that : 
{
| |  |  |
| |  |  |
         
 
Then, as {               ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } and {                       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} are isomorphic partitions of   
 , there 
exists      such that : 
{
 
 
 
  (   )   (     )
 (   )   (     )
 (   )   (     )
 (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )   (     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
 
and thus          ( ) ( )      , which means that      only depends on | | | |     
  
We now demonstrate a technical Lemma: 
Let’s first establish the very simple Proposition: 
Proposition 14. 
With       and    , let    [       ]     having only one extremum on [      
 ] and such that this extremum is a maximum, reached for  . If : 
|   |    and |   |    
then  (     )  ∑  ( )
    
      
 verifies, for|  | |  |    : 
 (     )
 ( )
   
 
 
. 
  We can suppose that       are integers, which does not change the above argument. The worst case 
to upper bound  (     ) is             
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 (     )   ( )  ∑  ( )
 
    |  |
 ∑  ( )
  |  |
   
  ( )  |  | ( )  |  | ( )
  ( )  |  |
∑  ( )    
 
 |  |
∑  ( )    
 
 (  
|  |
 
)∑  ( )
 
   
 (  
|  |
 
)∑ ( )
 
   
  ( )(  
   
 
(|  | |  |)
 
)
  ( ) (  
 
 
) 
  
Lemma 3. (Synchronized Strategy lemma) 
Let   be a strategy in   , and   and    be two probability distributions in  ( ) with at least 
one of them transformed by permutative sleeking (with a permutative sleeking transformation 
that will be explicited), say     [    ], then for   performing a synchronization of   and 
    , there exists a constant  ( ) such that : 
 [(     
   
  
)
 
]
  [      ]
 
  ( )
 
 
 
  The proof of lemma 3 is a bit long, we will sometimes give shortened explanations to avoid to 
present exhaustively some painful calculations. We divide the proof in 3 parts. In part 1, we will 
reduce the general Bernoulli distributions to simpler multi-Gaussian form. In part 2, we will discard 
the dependence in     . And in part 3, we will show that the resultant form from part 2 is not submitted 
to rapid variation in     when | | and | | are fixed. In the conclusive part, we will deal with border 
conditions. 
In the following, we will suppose      synchronized to   and thus we will denote the probability 
distribution directly      instead of       , and thus     [    ] instead of     [      ].   will 
be explicited in the course of the proof. We will also restrict the probability distributions to the 
generation of experiment vectors in {   }  instead of [   ]  because it eases the proof, and also 
because anyway, they are easier to manipulate with computers. 
We will denote in the followings: 
〈      〉   [(     
   
  
)
 
]
   
 
Part 1. 
Let’s first set the following quantities, for {     }    
  : 
 ( )  {    || |   } 
 (     )  {      || |    | |         } 
 ̂(     )  {      || |    | |         } 
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 (     )  ∫  ( )  ( )    
 
 (    )
 
     (   )  ∑   ( )  ( )
     (    )
 
{      } is a linearly independant set that generates a vector subspace ; by considering dimension and 
because for any     , 
      ( ( )  ( ))        (   ) 
this subspace is thus isomorphic to the vector subspace of the multinomials : 
{ ∑       ( )  ( )
    {   } 
|    } 
This implies that the multinomial       (
 
 
 
 
 
) can be written as linear combination of 
{     (   )}    . Let’s then write this combination, with same method than seen in Proposition 1 : 
∑   (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)
     (     )
 ∑
 
    
∑(  
 
 
)
| | |  |    
  ( )   ( )
   
    
     (     )
 ∑
 
    
(
 
 
 
∑  
     (     )
   
    )
 
 
 
(  
 
 
)
| | |  |    
  ( )   ( )
      ̂(     )
 
The drawing below: 
 
helps to understand the following expression of the above summing between brackets, where       
stand for   | |   |  |        : 
∑  
     (     )
   
    
 (
 
 
) ∑ (
   
 
) (
   
     
)(
     
   
)
    (          )
   
 
Thanks to which we obtain: 
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(
 
 
 
∑  
     (     )
   
    )
 
 
 
(  
 
 
)
| | |  |    
    (
 
  
) ∑      (
 
   
)          (
 
 
)         (
 
 
)
    (          )
   
    (
 
  
) ∑        (
 
   
)        (
 
 
)       (
 
 
)
    (        )
   
                      (    ) 
We remark that, at distance  (√
 
 
) in the neighborhood of : 
{
    ⁄
    ⁄
     ⁄
 
the three maxima of the Gaussian filters under the sum in (l3.1) are reached for an identical value of 
   
 
 
 because  
    
   
 
 
 ⁄  
 
  ⁄
     ⁄
 
 
   
 
And by also remarking that : 
         (
 
 
)  (   ( )) 
    
  
   
(
 
 
) 
we see that the width of the Gaussian filter        (
 
   
) in   is smaller than the width of the two 
other filters. Thus, by approximating the summing on the narrowest of the two other filters, we 
obtain that there exists a constant      such that : 
(    )    (  )   (
 
  
)         (
 
 
)        (
 
 
)∑       (
 
   
)
 
   
 
And because   
 
 
 
 
 
 in the considered neighborhood, we have : 
∑       (
 
   
)
 
   
   
Thus finally there exists a constant      such that : 
(    )    (  )   (
 
  
)    (
 
 
)   (
 
 
) 
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We saw that, as     , it can be written as       (| | | |    ), thus, in the followings, we will 
write          ( ). It follows from the above that : 
〈      〉    (  ) ∑ ∑ ( ∑ (∑(    ( )
 
                   
 
 
  
)
 
   (
 
  
)) (     ))    (
 
 
)   (
 
 
)                               (    ) 
which ends Part 1. 
Part 2. 
From Proposition 2 (ii),   
  
   (
 
  
) can be approximated (with    
 
  
(  
 
  
)) by 
 (   ) (     ) 
under the condition that | |  (
 
  
)
  ⁄
. On the other hand, from Proposition 2 (i), if | |   ( )√
 
  
 
for  ( ) sufficiently large, the remains of the binomial distribution can be kept bounded by  
 ( )
  
. 
Thus, supposing that     , it is possible to ease calculations to replace the binomial distributions by 
gaussian distributions in (l3.2), with a multiplicative lower bound. 
Let’s now consider : 
        ∫ (∫ (    ( )  
 
  
)
 
 (  
 
  
    )  
 
   
) (     )  
 
   
 
where     ( ) is extended to   being   outside [   ] (note also that  (     )    if   [   ]). The 
above argument means that there exists a constant      such that : 
〈      〉    (  ) ∑ ∑            (
 
 
)   (
 
 
)
            
                (     ) 
We now study         with objective to discard the dependence in    ( ). 
On one hand, if   and    are two random variables with identical probability distribution, and   a 
constant, we have the obvious relations : 
 [(   ) ]   [(   [ ]) ]  ( [ ]   )  
 
 
 [(    ) ]  ( [ ]   )  
 
 
 [(    ) ] 
which, applied to         gives : 
        ∫ (∫ (    (   )      ( ))
 
 (    
 
  
    ) ( 
 
     
 
   
 
 
  
    )     ) (     )                                                                     (    ) 
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We observe that : 
 (    
 
  
    ) (  
 
  
    )   (      ) (  
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
) 
We use the change of variable : 
(
 
 
)  (   
  ⁄
  
) (
 
 
) 
whose Jacobian is  . Let’s set, for  ]   [ : 
 (   )  { |(    | |     )  (   )} 
We have then, for   (   ) : 
 (   (  
   
 
)  )  √
   
  
   
 
 (       )  √  (       ) 
 (  
 
  
 
 
 
(  
   
 
)  )  √
   
  
   
 
 (  
 
  
     )  √  (  
 
  
     ) 
Applying the variable change to (    ) together with the above Gaussian relations, we obtain : 
         ∫  (      
 )∫ (∫ (    (   )      ( ))
 
 ( 
 
   
 
   (   )
 
   
 
 
  
     )   ) (      
   
 
)                                                        (    ) 
On the other hand, by applying the change of variable, for any  : 
(
 
 
)  (   
  
   
) 
we obtain the two equalities for         : 
        ∫ (∫ (    (   )  
 
  
 
  
 
)
 
 (  
 
  
 (     )  )  
 
   
) (         )  
 
   
 ∫  (       )∫ (∫ (    (   )  
 
  
 
  
 
)
 
 ( 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
  
 (     )  )  ) (         )                                           (    ) 
And trivially: 
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        ∫  (      
 )∫ (∫ (    ( )  
 
  
)
 
 ( 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
  
    )   ) (     )                                                                      (    ) 
As before we lower bound the involved Gaussian distributions, for   (   ): 
 (  
 
  
 (     )  )  √
  
     
 (  
 
  
     )  √
 
 
 (  
 
  
     ) 
 (  
 
  
    )  √
  
 
 (  
 
  
     )  √  (  
 
  
     ) 
(    ) and (    ) are thus lower-bounded in respectively: 
        √
 
 
∫  (       )∫ (∫ (    (   )  
 
  
 
  
 
)
 
 ( 
 
   
 
   (   )
 
   
 
 
  
     )   ) (         )                                                           (    ) 
        √ ∫  (      
 )∫ (∫ (    ( )  
 
  
)
 
 ( 
 
   
 
   (   )
 
   
 
 
  
     )  ) (     )                                                                      (    ) 
For any     and      , we have: 
        
  
(   )
(   )     
 
(   ) (   )  
By applying this to (    ) and (    ) we obtain: 
        √
 
 
∫  (       )∫ (∫ (    (   )      ( )  
  
 
)
 
 ( 
 
   
 
   (   )
 
   
 
 
  
     )   )   
 
( (     )  (         ))                           (    ) 
Then we apply a second time the inequality, this time to (    ) and (    ) to finally discard   in the 
lower bound of         : 
           
 
(  √
 
 
)∫
    
  
 (       )∫    
 
( (     )  (     
 
   (   )
 
   
 
   
 
)   (         ))                                                                   (     ) 
which ends Part 2. 
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Part 3. 
In this last but not least part, we will lower bound the minimum appearing in (     ), by showing that 
 (     ) is slowly varying in  , slowly compared to a variation of    , when probability 
distributions  and   verify the separable criteria (e.g. are in  ( )), with at least one of them, say   , 
being sufficiently sleek, as stated in the hypothesis of the lemma. 
   being result of a permutative sleeking transformation, there exists a probability distribution 
     ( ) and a permutative sleeking kernel   (that we will carefully choose) such that : 
  ( )  ∑  (| |)     ( )
    
 
And then (restricting     to {   }  instead of [   ] ) : 
 (     )  ∑  ( ) ∑  (| |)     ( )
        (    )
 ∑
(
 
 
∑  (| |)
    
 ( )    )
 
 
 ( )   ( )
     ( )  ( )
 ∑
(
 
 
 
∑ ( ) ∑  
    
 ( )    
| |  
 
   
)
 
 
 
 ( )   ( )
     ( )  ( )
 ∑
(
 
 
 
∑ ( ) ∑
(
 
 
 
∑  
    
 ( )   
| |  )
 
 
 
    ( )
      
 
   
)
 
 
 
 ( )   ( )
     ( )  ( )
    (     ) 
It is easy to verify that, for any        : 
| |  |       | 
as shown in the proof of Proposition 11. We set : 
  (  ‖    ‖
 )  ∑  
    
 ( )   
| |  
        ( ) 
This writing can be justified thanks to the above by observing that,       : 
∑  
    
   ( )  (  )
| |  
 ∑  
    
       ( )   
|       |  
 ∑  
     
  ( )   
|  |  
 
          being a bijective transformation in   . The explicit calculation of   (   ) can be 
obtained but is not necessary for the proof. We can then write (     ) as follows : 
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 (     )  ∑
(
 
 
 
∑ ( )∑  (   )
(
 
 
 
∑  
    ( )
      
‖    ‖   )
 
 
  
   
 
   
)
 
 
 
 ( )   ( )
     ( )  ( )
       (     ) 
The quantity in the internal brackets of the above can be calculated by considering the drawing below : 
 
   can be considered as partitionned in zones        , with the following constraints : 
{
 
 
 
 
                                    
      
 
 
                        
      
 
 
            
                                                        
 
Let’s denote : 
  (         )     
 
(              
 
 
   
 
 
) 
  (           )     
 
(        
 
 
             
 
 
) 
           ( )  (
     
   
) (
   
 
) (
     
    ⁄   
) (
         
    ⁄   
) 
Then, the counting of the quantity in the internal brackets of (     ) gives, with the help of the above 
drawing : 
 (           )  ∑  
    ( )
      
‖    ‖   
 ∑            ( )
  (          )
    (        )
 
It can be shown with no particular difficulty that   (         )    (           ). The 
boundaries being non empty imply that : 
   
 
(      ⁄      ⁄ )     
 
(     )    ⁄  |     |                (     ) 
Let’s set also : 
  (   )  ∑ ( )  (   )
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  (     )   [(     )
 ]  ∑  (| |)
    
∫ (       ( ))
 
 ( )   ( )    
 
   [   ] 
 ∑ ( )  
 (
  
 
  (     )   ( ))
 
   
 
The last relation coming from Lemma 2. 
 (     ) can be expressed with those notations : 
 (     )  ∑ ∑  (   ) (           )
 
   
 ( )   ( )
     ( )  ( )
 
Injecting this relation into (     ), and denoting : 
     (           )   (       
   
 
      )         
we obtain the intermediary lower bound (from (     ) and (     )) : 
〈      〉         
 
(  √
 
 
) ∑ ∑ ∑  (   ) (∫
    
  
 (  
 
| |     ⁄
 
        ( )  ( )       
   ̂( )
     )   
 
(        )   ) ( ) 
  ( )                                                   (     ) 
where  ̂( )  { |     } ; indeed, if | |      ⁄ , then  (   )   ̂( ). 
We will now concentrate on    (        ), to discard the minimum with lower bound by a 
constant under the hypothesis of the Lemma. 
We set the following conditions under simplex form (their role will appear later) : 
( )
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ( )  { |     }                                                                                           ( )
  ( )  {     |(     )
      }                                                              ( )
  ( )  {           |(      
 
 
(
   
 
 
     
   
))
 
    }          ( )
  ( 
 )  {         |   
 
(    (
 
 
)      (
   
 
))    }                          ( )
  (  
     )  {         | (        
   
 
)     }                                   ( )
 
where : 
 (          ⁄ )     
 
(
(    ⁄ )(     )   
  
 
(      ⁄ )(     )(         )
(   ) 
) 
From (     ), we can write the weaker lower bound : 
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〈      〉         
 
(  √
 
 
) ∑ ∑  (   ) (∫
    
  
 (  
 
| |     ⁄
 
          
     ( )  ( )
          
     )   
 
(        )   ) ( ) 
  ( )                                                   (     ) 
The condition    comes from the examination of the distance between the unique pick of            ( ) 
and the boundaries of the summing   (         ) and   (           ). The extrema of   verify 
(with error lesser than a unit) : 
(   )(     )(    
 
 )(              
 
 )
 (         )(  
 
     )(  
 
   )
             (     ) 
obtained by writing 
           (   )
          ( )
  . 
The boundaries of the summing  imply that : 
  [  
 
 
  ]  [    
 
 
    ] 
One observes that there exists only one unique zero of (     ) within the boundaries. Indeed, the 
numerator is a decreasing function within the boundaries, because its four monomials are positive and 
decreasing within. On the other hand the numerator is increasing because its four monomials are 
positive and increasing within. Thus there exists a unique zero. In addition, that zero is a maximum of 
  because   is increasing at righthand neighborhood of the lower boundary    (the fraction is there 
    ). 
Let    be the maximum. It can be shown without any particular difficulty (we won’t present the 
useless details here) that : 
   
  {  }
 (    
 )  
 
  
   
 
(    (     )     (     )     
  (     )     
  (     )) 
(      ) 
where : 
    (   )  
(   )(       )
 (   )
 
It is easy to remark that : 
  ( 
 )     
 
(    (     )     (     )     
  (     )     
  (     ))     
The strategy for examining    (        ) is to put   under the shape : 
 ( )   (    ) ( )(   ( )) 
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where   is a gaussian distribution with   indeprendant from   and  , and   is a gaussian distribution 
whose filter’s width is large compared to      √  . Indeed then   varies slowly by translation of 
lentgh     and a variation of   in   causes an indicial translation of length       in the summing in 
 , and this length can be shown as remaining small compared to     {  }  (    
 ). 
To that extent, we consider the following grouping in  : 
  
           ( )  ((
   
 
) (
     
    ⁄   
))((
     
   
) (
         
    ⁄   
)) 
Let’s first remark that, for any integers         , such that : 
   
 
(       )       
 
(   ) 
we have,    ]   [ : 
(
 
   
) (
 
   
)  
    (   )         (   )     
    (   )    (   )
(
 
   
) (
 
   
)
 
 
    (   )    (   )
     ( )     ( ) 
We choose  , in such a manner that the picks in   of the above binomial distributions coincide in a 
common pick in   . This leads to : 
{
       
         
 
which results in   
   
   
 and    
     
   
. 
Then, from Proposition 2 (ii) at the neighborhood of    we get : 
(
 
   
) (
 
   
) 
 
        (   )    (   )  √  
 
 
   
  (   )  
(  
     
   )
 
 
We apply this approximation to both grouping in  , and we denote    and    the respective picks of 
both grouping. We have : 
            
 
 
(
   
 
 
     
   
) 
We determine now the permutative sleeking kernel as follows : 
 ( )  
 
  
  ( 
    ) 
where  (   )  {
         
        
. By using the same technique than in Lemma 2 to perform the 
calculations, we obtain (calculations are a bit painful but present no higher difficulty than in Lemma 2, 
it is required that     {   }  to get the result) that there exists a constant      such that : 
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 [(      
 
 
(
   
 
 
     
   
))
 
]   (   
   )                   (     ) 
This important relation justifies the choice of condition   , that thus implies : 
(     )
      
  is chosen such that : 
   
            √                                                   (      ) 
which can be made possible (see discussion on parameters at the end of the proof), and enables us to 
obtain, from Proposition 2, the simultaneous validity of the Gaussian approximations for the two 
grouping within  . Indeed, the filter’s width for them are respectively : 
{
 
 
 (    ⁄ )(     )   
  
    (    )                                     
 (      ⁄ )(     )(         )
(   ) 
    (     )
 
that are both of superior to     √   under condition   ( ) and   ( 
  ). 
We then use the identity : 
 (   )    (    )  (    ) (  
       
    
)
 
 
   (    ) 
    
 
to reconstruct the two Gaussian under the shape : 
 (    ) ( ) 
We find : 
  (  
  (      ⁄ )(     )(         )
(   ) (    ⁄ )(     )   
)
  
 
In addition, the filter’s width of   equals to : 
(      
  
)   (
(    ⁄ )(     )   
  
 
(      ⁄ )(     )(         )
(   ) 
)
   (          ⁄ ) √   
due to (     ) and (for last inequality above) under condition   . 
As (    )  (     )
          √  , we have : 
 ( )   (           )    (         ) 
 
   (    ) 
     [   
 
 
    ] 
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When we apply the indicial translation of length         √   in the summing in  (corresponding 
to the variation of   in        ), it remains very small compared the distance from the pick to the 
boundaries, indeed, under    and    (and considering (     ) and (     
 )) : 
   
  {  }
 (    
 )  
 
 
   √     
We must choose    so that : 
 √      √                                                      (     
  ) 
and remaining compatible with (      ). 
From Proposition 14 applied to the sub-part   of            ( ) within the boundaries of the summing 
in  we obtain, for  {     } : 
∑  (   (   
   
 
))
  (   
   
 )
    (   
   
 )
 (  
(   )   
 
) ∑  (    )
  ( )
    ( )
 
And finally : 
    
 
 
 (  
(   )   
 
)    
 
 
 (  
    
 
)   
which also means that : 
   
 
(        )   
 
 
 (  
    
 
)                                  (     ) 
We note that, by choice of kernel  , we have necessarily       (because otherwise   (   )   ), 
and thus   (  
     )    (   
  ). 
This ends Part 3. 
In order to finish the proof, we will now deal with the conditions         and discuss the values of 
the parameters                 . 
First, we can inject (     ) in (     ) to obtain : 
〈      〉         
 
(  √
 
 
)  
 
 (∫ (  
    
 
)
    
  
 (  
 
| |     ⁄
     )  ) ∑ ∑  (   ) (           )
 
   
 ( )   ( )
       
     ( )  ( )
          
 
(     ) 
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We have : 
∑ ∑  (   ) (           )
 
   
 ( )   ( )
       
     ( )  ( )
          
 ∑ ∑  (   ) (           )
 
   
 ( )   ( )
       
     ( )  ( )
        
  
 ∑ ∑  (   ) (           )
 
   
 ( )   ( )
       
     ( )  ( )
  ̅̅ ̅
                        (      ) 
We can thus deal with             all together on one hand, and    (that is the only one of the 5 
conditions depending on  ) on the other hand. As already explained above, the choice of kernel   
gives : 
  (   )  {
  (  
   )            
                             
 
We can first remark the following dependence between the conditions            . As already 
noticed : 
  ( 
 )     
 
(    (     )     (     )     
  (     )     
  (     ))     
In addition, still under   ( 
 ), it can easily be seen that : 
 (           )    
 
    
which implies that, 
if   
 
       , then   ( 
 )    (  
     ).                        (     ) 
At last, under   ( ) and   ( 
 ), 
   
 
    
 
 
    |
 
 
 
   
 
|      
√  
 
 
which implies that, 
if     
√  
 
  , then   ( )    ( 
 )    ( ).                        (      ) 
This means that under conditions (     ) and (      ) on               , we have : 
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∑ ∑  (   ) (           )
 
   
 ( )   ( )
       
     ( )  ( )
        
 ∑ ∑  (   ) (           )
 
   
 ( )   ( )
       
     ( )  ( )
    
 ∑ ∑ ∑  (| |)
    
 ( )    
    
(     )      
 ( )   ( )
      
     ( )  ( )
  
 ∑ ∑  (| |)
    
( ( )      )      
 ( )   ( )
      
     ( )  ( )
  
 ∑ ∑
 ( ( )      ) 
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( ( )      )      
 ( )   ( )
      
     ( )  ( )
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(    (
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)      (
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 ( ( )      ) 
     
 (| |)
    
( ( )      )      
 ( )   ( )
      
     ( )  ( ) 
   ∑ ∑
 ( ( )      ) 
     
 (| |)
    
( ( )      )      
 ( )   ( )
      
     ( )  ( ) 
 ∑ ∑     (
 ( )  
 
)    (
   
 
)
 ( ( )      ) 
     
 (| |)
     
 ( )   ( )
      
     ( )  ( ) 
 
     
     
   ∑ ∑
 ( ( )      ) 
     
 (| |)
    
( ( )      )      
 ( )   ( )
      
     ( )  ( ) 
 
where the first inequality comes from the fact that  |     |        as expressed in (     ). In 
the second inequality, the first term can be lower-bounded thanks to Corollary 1, and the third term 
can be upper bounded by    . 
To deal with the first term, we replace    by     as follows : 
   ( )  ∑  (| |)      ( )
    
 
where   is the permutative sleeking transformation introduced in Corollary 1.  
We thus get then from Corollary 1: 
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∑ ∑  (   ) (           )
 
   
 ( )   ( )
       
     ( )  ( )
        
  ( )  
  
√ 
  (
 
√ 
)  
     
     
                                                            (     ) 
It remains now to upper bound the term conditioned by    as appearing in (     
 ), this can be easily 
done thanks to Markov inequality : 
∑ ∑  (   ) (           )
 
   
 ( )   ( )
       
     ( )  ( )
  ̅̅ ̅
 ∑ ∑  (     ) (           )
   
   
 ( )   ( )
       
     ( )  ( )
  ̅̅ ̅
 ∑ ∑
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where last inequality comes from (     ) ; we know that 
   
   
   
   from (      ). 
As long as   
  
 
, we can write : 
∫
    
  
 (       )  
 
| |     ⁄
 ∫
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   )  
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) 
 ( 
 
  
   ) 
Finally, we get from (     ), (      ), (     ) and the above : 
〈      〉         
 
(  √
 
 
)  
 
 (  
  √  
 
)(
  
 
(  
 
  
)   
 
  
   )( ( )  
  
√ 
  (
 
√ 
)
 
     
     
     
   
   
   
)                                                    (     ) 
And we obtained from Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 the lower/upper bound for    : 
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    ( ))   ( ) 
This inequality (     ), that gives the result of Lemma 3, can only stand if the following simplex 
conditions can be satisfied ((      ), ((       ), (     ), (      )) : 
 
( )  
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ( )                            ( )
 
√ 
  ( )                          ( )
    ( )                           ( )
    ( )                            ( )
    
 
                              ( )
   
 
   
  ( )                       ( )
  
 
                            ( )
    
√  
 
                    ( )
 √      √                 ( )
 √     
  √               (  )
 
Replacing    by its lower/upper bound above, it can be easily seen that those conditions can be 
satisfied.          can be chosen to satisfy (3), (4) and (7) (with    small compared to them), then   is 
chosen to satisfy (8), then    is chosen sufficiently small so that   can exist (it is sufficient that 
       (
  
  
    ( )) ( ) by gathering (6) and (10), thanks to which   can be found in 
 
 (
  
  
    ( )) ( )
   
    
   
), and finally   is chosen sufficiently large to match (2), (5), (8) and (9). 
The permutative sleeking transformation to adopt is (with notation of Corollary 1) : 
        [ 
   ] 
and Proposition 11 confirms that such composition is still a permutative sleeking transformation. 
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The Synchronized Strategy Lemma enables us to get the following general result: 
Theorem 3. 
Let  be a sleeked  distribution (under the meaning of Proposition 12 in Annex 1) in  ( ), then: 
(i) For any strategy  , there exist       such that 〈      〉  
  
 
 
(ii) For any strategy  , 
 
  
∑ 〈     〉  
  
     
  
  
(iii) is an immediate consequence of the Synchronized Strategy Lemma: 
 
  
∑ 〈{    }    〉
    
 
 
  
∑ 〈{  ( ) ( )}  〉
    
 〈{
 
  
∑   ( ) ( )
    
}   〉 
And because 
 
  
∑   ( ) ( )       , the right hand term of the above inequality can be lower 
bounded by 
  
 
 as stated by Lemma 3. 
And (ii) is an immediate consequence of (iii) as the average summing is lesser than the maximum 
element. 
  
 
 
 
